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 In this work, I study several aspects of the economics of education and health.  The first 
chapter focuses on education, analyzing the New York City Teacher Bonus Program.  Recent 
reviews of the program have found lower student test scores at schools randomly chosen to 
receive performance pay than at control schools not eligible for bonuses.  Several studies have 
suggested lower intrinsic motivation among teachers at treatment schools as a possible 
mechanism driving these surprising results.  The program was abruptly ended after three years, 
allowing me to use post-trial data to study the program’s persistent effect on intrinsic motivation 
absent any effect on extrinsic motivation.  While I replicate prior results showing that the teacher 
bonus program had a negative impact on student test scores, a difference-in-difference analysis 
of teacher survey responses indicates that this was not likely caused by a change in teachers’ 
intrinsic motivation.  Moreover, a regression discontinuity (RD) study demonstrates that the 
observed “negative” effect on test scores was not driven by a decline in performance at treatment 
schools, but rather by an increase in performance at control schools. This finding highlights a 
risk with RCT experiments in the social sciences: even with proper randomization, the control 
group may not be a valid counterfactual for the treatment group. 
 The second chapter – written with coauthors Jason Hockenberry, Michael Grossman, 






invasive surgery.  Over the last several decades, numerous medical studies have compared the 
effectiveness of two common procedures for Coronary Artery Disease: Percutaneous Coronary 
Intervention (PCI) and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG).  Most evidence indicates that 
CABG – the more invasive procedure – leads to superior long term outcomes for otherwise 
similar patients, though there is little consensus as to why.  In this article, we propose a novel 
explanation: patient offsetting behavior.  We hypothesize that patients who undergo the more 
invasive procedure, CABG, are more likely to improve their behavior – eating, exercise, 
smoking, and drinking – in a way that increases longevity.  To test our hypothesis, we use 
Medicare records linked to the National Health Interview Survey to study one such behavior: 
smoking.  We find that CABG patients are 12 percentage points more likely to quit smoking in 
the one-year period immediately surrounding their procedure than PCI patients, a result that is 
robust to numerous alternative specifications. 
 The third chapter combines education and health, studying the effect of schools on 
students’ weight.  In this chapter, I use New York City’s high school admissions process as a 
natural experiment to assess the impact of going to a particular school on student weight, BMI, 
and probability of being overweight or obese.  For each high school that admitted students by an 
oversubscribed lottery, I compare the weight (or BMI, overweight, or obesity) of students 
admitted to a particular school with the weight of students who applied, but were not admitted 
based purely on a random number.  Analyzing over 100 lotteries, I find statistically significant 
school effects on student weight about as often as one would expect by chance.  I conclude that 
within NYC the specific high school a student attends is unlikely to have a substantial effect on 
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1. Does Performance Pay Reduce Teachers’ Intrinsic Motivation?  Evidence from the New 












Merit pay, or pay-for-performance, is common in many industries (Lemeiux, MacLeod, 
and Parent, 2009). Salespeople are often paid on commission, waiters receive a substantial 
portion of their pay in tips, and bankers receive year-end bonuses based, in part, on their 
supervisors’ assessment of their performance. By contrast, public school teachers in the U.S. are 
usually paid according to a uniform, district-wide pay scale that takes into account years of 
experience, level of education, and little else.  Over the last decade, many schools and districts 
have started to experiment with merit pay, often paying teachers bonuses based on their students’ 
test scores.  In 2009, the U.S. Department of Education said it would judge schools applying for 
the Federal Race to the Top grants, in part, on the degree to which they used teacher and 
principal evaluations “to provide opportunities for highly effective teachers and principals...to 
obtain additional compensation...”.
2
 When the Round 1 winners – Tennessee and Delaware – 
were announced on March 29, 2010, both states had teacher bonus programs as part of their 
proposals. 
 Internationally, evaluations of teacher bonus programs have found largely positive 
impacts on student test scores and other outcomes (see Lavy, 2009 in Israel; Glewwe, Ilias, and 
Kremer, 2010 in Kenya; and Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011, in India).  However, within 
the United States, the two large teacher bonus programs that have been rigorously evaluated have 
shown no positive impact on student test scores or other outcomes.  In Nashville, the Project on 
Incentives in Teaching (POINT) program provided middle school math teachers with the 
potential to win individual bonuses of up to $15,000 annually based on improvement in their 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Michael Grossman, David Jaeger, Ted Joyce, Steve O’Connell, seminar participants at the 
CUNY Graduate Center, and attendees at the Association for Education Finance and Policy Annual Conference for 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this research. 






students’ math test scores.  After three years, students in randomly selected treatment classrooms 
– whose teachers were eligible for bonuses – showed no improvement in test scores over 
students in control classrooms (Springer et al., 2010).  In New York City, the School-Wide 
Performance Bonus program – hereafter referred to as the NYC teacher bonus program – 
provided teachers and other educators at high-needs schools with the opportunity to win a 
roughly $3,000 annual bonus based on their school’s performance on the Progress Report (an 
annual evaluation of test scores and other outcomes).  After three years, students at schools 
randomly selected to be in the treatment group showed no better – and in some cases, worse – 
outcomes on standardized tests and other measures (Marsh et. al., 2011; Fryer, 2013; Goodman 
and Turner, 2013). 
 These results run counter to classical economic theory, which posits a strong link 
between performance-based-pay and improved performance.  In traditional economic models, 
both greater consumption and greater leisure are assumed to increase utility.  If one’s 
consumption does not increase with greater work effort – since pay is unrelated to effort – then 
one will work as little as possible to maximize leisure.  Researchers in social psychology, 
however, have theorized that people are intrinsically motivated to undertake many activities and 
providing performance-based pay for an intrinsically motivating activity can be 
counterproductive.  Performance-based pay can decrease intrinsic motivation and potentially 
performance, a finding that has been repeatedly demonstrated in laboratory settings. 
In a pioneering study, college students were provided with the opportunity to work on a 
series of challenging puzzles, and half of the students were paid based on the number of puzzles 
they solved.  Those who were paid proved to be less motivated to work on these puzzles at a later 






conducted the study, said it “supported the hypothesis that if monetary rewards are given to 
subjects for doing an intrinsically motivated activity, and if the rewards are made contingent on 
their performance, their intrinsic motivation for the activity will decrease” (Deci, 1975, p. 132).  
In a related study, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini find that compared to an unpaid control 
group, college students do worse on an IQ test if paid a small sum of money per right answer, 
though better if paid a large sum (2000a).   
One field study showing behavior consistent with a loss of intrinsic motivation is 
sometimes called the Israeli Daycare Study (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b).  In an effort to 
encourage parents to pick up their children on time, ten daycare centers in Israel began levying a 
small fine on those who were late.  After levying the fine, the proportion of parents arriving late 
to pick up their children increased, prompting the centers to remove the fine.  However, even 
when the fine was removed, the proportion of parents arriving late stayed at the new higher level. 
 The design of the New York City teacher bonus program offers an opportunity to test for 
this phenomenon – financial incentives reducing intrinsic motivation – in a rigorous, real-world 
setting.  Starting in the 2007/08 school year – hereafter referred to as 2008 – the NYC teacher 
bonus program was run as a three-year randomized controlled trial, with 212 treatment schools 
and 184 control schools (of which 175 treatment schools and 127 control schools – the focus of 
this study – had elementary or middle school testing data in all years between 2006 and 2013).  
The entire group of 396 schools was not, itself, a random sub-sample New York City’s 1,200+ 
schools.  Rather, it included the 396 highest-need schools, as defined by their Progress Report 




                                                 
3 The peer index is intended to be a measure of fixed student characteristics at a school.  At elementary and K-8 






At treatment schools, all educators affiliated with the local teachers’ union (the United 
Federation of Teachers) were eligible to receive bonuses averaging $3,000 per person if their 
school met its target on the annual New York City Progress Report.
4
  At the K-8 level, a school’s 
score on the Progress Report was determined largely by students’ test scores and growth in test 
scores (85%), attendance (5%) and the results of parent, teacher, and student surveys (10%).  At 
the high school level, a portion of the weight was removed from test scores and placed on a 
school’s graduation rate and students’ credit accumulation.   
Educators at 62% of treatment schools won a bonus during the first year of the program 
(2008), a rate that rose to 88% during the second year (2009), and 13% during the third year 
(2010).  Over the three years of the program, New York City paid out nearly $56 million in 
bonuses (Marsh et al. 2011).  On January 20, 2011, the New York City Department of Education 
(NYCDOE) announced it was suspending the teacher bonus program, based on uncertain 
benefits and budget constraints.
5
  In July, 2011, after the RAND Corporation released its final 
report, the NYCDOE permanently ended the teacher bonus program
6
 (Marsh et al., 2011).  After 
the conclusion of the three-year pilot, 2011 was the first school year in which teachers at 
treatment schools no longer had the possibility of receiving a performance bonus. 
In explaining the neutral to negative results of the New York City bonus program, 
researchers have pointed to a decrease in intrinsic motivation as one possible cause.  Referring to 
their finding of a negative and statistically significant effect of the bonus program on math test 
scores at large schools, Goodman and Turner (2013) say that “One explanation is that the bonus 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hispanic, are English Language Learners, or qualify for free or reduced price lunch.  At the middle school level, the 
peer index is based on the average Math and ELA test scores students earned in 4
th
 grade, prior to entering middle 
school.  At the high school level, the peer index is based on the average Math and ELA test scores students earned in 
8
th
 grade, prior to entering high school. 
4 A committee of two teachers and two principal appointees determined the exact distribution of the bonus among 
all eligible recipients.  In 2008, 52% of staff who received an award received exactly $3,000 (Marsh et. al., 2011) 
5 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/nyregion/21bonuses.html.   






program crowded out teachers’ intrinsic motivation…”  Fryer (2013), who finds a negative effect 
on the bonus program on middle school math and language arts test scores, says that “…some 
argue that teacher incentives can decrease a teacher’s intrinsic motivation…”  And Marsh et al 
(2011), who conducted extensive interviews with New York City teachers as part of the 
program’s official evaluation, report that “In many schools, staff members also typically 
attributed their hard work and their efforts to improve their practices to intrinsic motivations far 
above any external pressures or incentives.” 
 In my study, I seek to answer the following question: did the New York City teacher 
bonus program lower teachers’ intrinsic motivation?  I do this by extending prior research in 
three ways.  First, I use the RCT assignment to assess the impact of the bonus program on 
student test scores in the three years following the suspension of the program.  To the extent the 
bonus has a persistent negative effect on intrinsic motivation – as prior literature indicates it 
might – studying the post-suspension period allows me to disentangle this effect from any 
positive effect on extrinsic motivation during the program period itself.  Second, I conduct an 
item-level analysis of the NYC teacher survey using all questions asked consistently before, 
during, and after the teacher bonus program.  Using a difference-in-differences (DD) 
methodology, I assess the impact of the bonus program on teacher responses to questions related 
to intrinsic motivation and compare this to the impact of the bonus program on questions 
unrelated to intrinsic motivation.
7
  Finally, I complement the RCT with a regression 
discontinuity (RD) study of student test scores, taking advantage of the fact that the entire 
experimental sample – both treatment and control schools – represent the highest-need one-third 
                                                 
7 The canonical DD study has one first difference over time, whereas the two differences I note here are between the 
treatment and control group and between questions related and unrelated to intrinsic motivation.  I address the time 
dimension in my study in two ways.  First, I estimate a model where I control for the difference in survey scores in 
2007, before the bonus program was introduced.  Second, I estimate a triple difference model, where the third 






of schools in New York, as defined by a continuous index with a rigid cut point.  This allows me 
to use non-eligible schools as a counterfactual for both the treatment and control schools and 
answer the following question: do we observe a negative effect of the bonus program because the 
treatment schools went down relative to their (unobserved) counterfactual or, rather, because the 
control schools improved? 
 In analyzing the post-program period, I find that the negative effects of the bonus 
program on student test scores continued and grew after the program was suspended.  The bonus 
program caused treatment schools to perform between 0.13 and 0.17 standard deviations worse 
than control schools in math and between 0.08 and 0.13 standard deviations worse in language 
arts in the three years following the program’s suspension.
8
  While this result, taken alone, is 
consistent with a decrease in intrinsic motivation among teachers at treatment schools, the next 
two analyses provide evidence against such an interpretation.  In analyzing the teacher survey, I 
again show that the bonus program had an effect: teacher survey scores at treatment schools were 
lower during the post-program period.  However, the trend is the same for questions related and 
unrelated to intrinsic motivation, a pattern one wouldn’t expect if changes in intrinsic motivation 
were driving this result.  Finally, in the RD analysis – where I use non-eligible schools as a 
counterfactual for both the treatment and control schools – I replicate the main results from the 
RCT analysis: students at treatment schools had lower test scores than students at control 
schools, especially in the period following the suspension of the bonus program.  However, this 
does not appear to be caused by a decline in performance at treatment schools, but rather by an 
improvement at control schools.  This finding is inconsistent with a decline in intrinsic 
motivation among teachers at treatment schools and suggests that another mechanism may be 
                                                 







driving the NYC teacher bonus program results observed in this and other studies.  Overall, I 
find little evidence to suggest that intrinsic motivation declined at schools participating in the 
New York City teacher bonus program. 
 
1. 2 Methodology & Data 
 In this paper, I analyze the impact of the NYC teacher bonus program on teachers’ 
intrinsic motivation in three ways.  First, I take advantage of the fact that the program was 
designed as a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) to assess its impact on student test scores.  I 
compare average school-wide student test scores in math and language arts in treatment schools 
to those in control schools.  Second, I use a difference-in-differences methodology to study the 
impact of the program on teacher attitudes.  Making use of the RCT, I assess the impact of the 
bonus program on teacher responses to survey questions related to intrinsic motivation and 
compare that to the impact of the bonus program on teacher survey questions unrelated to 
intrinsic motivation.  Third, I use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design to better understand 
the mechanism behind the observed RCT results.  In particular, I analyze whether the test score 
results observed in the RCT are due to a decline in performance at treatment schools or an 
improvement in performance at control schools. 
In each analysis, I study the impact of the bonus program over eight years, which are 
divided into three distinct periods in Table 1.1.  In the pre-program period, comprised of the 
years 2006 and 2007, I expect no impact of the bonus program on test scores or teacher attitudes 
because the program had not yet been announced.  Analyzing these years serves to validate the 
randomization and provide a falsification test.  During the three-year program period (2008 to 






student test scores and teacher survey results is indeterminate.  For student test scores, any 
negative impact of the program due to teachers’ lower intrinsic motivation might have been 
offset by a positive impact of the reward on teachers’ extrinsic motivation.  For teacher survey 
results, the tendency to report lower levels of intrinsic motivation might have been offset by the 
desire to actually win a bonus; teacher survey results made up 3-5% of a school’s Progress 
Report score, on which the bonus was based.  Once the bonus program was suspended in 2011, 
the extrinsic reward was removed, leaving only any persistent change in intrinsic motivation.  As 
indicated by the results of the Israeli Daycare Study, once a person’s intrinsic motivation has 
been lowered by an external reward/penalty, it may not quickly return to its previous higher 
level.  If true in the case of the New York City teacher bonus program, we would be most likely 
to observe results consistent with a decrease in teachers’ intrinsic motivation after the bonus was 
removed.   
 













Indeterminate Positive effect of extrinsic reward countered by 




Negative Loss of intrinsic motivation only (to the extent it 
persists)






1.2.1 Student Test Scores (Randomized Controlled Trial) 
In line with prior research on the New York City teacher bonus program, I focus first on 
student test scores in math and ELA in grades 3 through 8.  In addition to connecting with prior 
literature, student test scores are a useful starting point for two reasons.  First, a large body of 
research has established that teachers have a strong influence on student test scores, so it is 
plausible to think that a change in teachers’ intrinsic motivation would be reflected in their 
students’ scores (Rockoff, 2004, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005, Kane and Staiger, 2008).  
Second, for many policy makers, a change in teachers’ intrinsic motivation is important only if it 
affects student outcomes (of which test scores are one measure).  Assuming policy makers are 
primarily concerned with improving student outcomes, and only secondarily with the welfare of 
the education workforce, a change in teacher attitudes that affects student performance will be 
more important than one that does not. 
 In New York State, all third through eighth graders who are not severely disabled take 
standardized tests in the second half of the year.  For the years 2006 through 2013, the NYCDOE 
web site provides information on average test scores and number of students tested by grade by 
school.  I create a single average test score variable for each school in each year, weighting by 
the number of students in each grade.  To create the average test score variable, I normalize the 
scaled scores within each grade to have mean zero and standard deviation one – based on the 
citywide distribution of average school-level test scores – before combining into a single school-
level average.  In the results below, I restrict my sample to those schools that have ELA test 
score data for all years in the study period: 2006 to 2013.  This excludes two schools that opened 
during this period and ten schools that closed during this period.  My results are robust to 






To assess the impact of the NYC teacher bonus program on student test scores, I fit the 
simple linear model shown in Equation 1.1 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
 
                                                    (1.1) 
 
In Equation 1.1,        represents the average school-wide test score at school   in year 
 ,    is a dummy variable equal to one if school   was invited to be in the treatment group and 
zero if school   was placed in the control group,              is the pre-treatment average test 
score, and     represents a vector of school-level control variables.  Assuming random 
assignment to the treatment group,    represents the causal effect on student test scores of being 
invited to participate in the teacher bonus program.  Since not all schools invited to participate 
chose to do so,    should be viewed as an Intention to Treat (ITT) estimate.
9
  Neither 
             nor     are necessary to identify the causal impact of the bonus program on student 
test scores.  They are included only to reduce residual variance and allow for a more precise 
impact estimate.  In the base specification, I restrict both    and    to be zero.  
 
1.2.2 Teacher Survey Responses (Difference-In-Differences) 
 To assess the impact of the teacher bonus program on a more direct measure of intrinsic 
motivation, I use teacher responses to the New York City School Survey.  Every year, in March 
and April, all parents, all teachers, and students in grade 6 and above are invited to fill out the 
NYC School Survey.  When the surveys were first collected in April, 2007, the response rate was 
26% for parents, 44% for teachers, and 65% for students.  The surveys collected in April, 2013, 
                                                 
9 To be part of the program, 55% of UFT represented staff had to vote to participate.  According to Marsh et. al. 






had a response rate of 54% for parents and 83% for teachers and students.  On the teacher 
survey, many questions have been asked consistently for most or all of the time period under 
study.  From 2007 to 2012, for example, teachers were asked for their agreement with the 
statement: “Teachers in my school recognize and respect colleagues who are the most effective 
teachers.”  Teachers could respond that they Strongly Agreed, Agreed, Disagreed, or Strongly 
Disagreed with this statement.  For each question in each school, the NYCDOE assigned a score 
from 0 to 10 along a Likert-like scale, with 0 corresponding to Strongly Disagree and 10 
corresponding to Strongly Agree (or the reverse, when Strongly Agree was a negative response).  
Collections of questions were grouped into four categories – academic expectations, 
communication, engagement, and safety – and average scores for each category were calculated.  
For each category, the average score across all respondent groups – teachers, students, and 
parents – appears on the Progress Report and counts for 10% of a school’s letter grade.  Detailed 
item-level data by school are made available on the NYCDOE’s web site. 
 I focus on the 45 questions that were asked consistently between 2007 and 2012.  I 
exclude 2013 since the survey was redesigned that year and the majority of questions changed.  I 
identify questions related to intrinsic motivation in two ways.  First, I review the questions and 
subjectively divide them into nine questions that I consider to be most closely related to intrinsic 
motivation and 36 remaining questions (see Table A.1.1 in the appendix).  Second, I select the 
one question on the 2012 survey that was most closely related to the items on widely-used 
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Deci & Ryan, 2014): “I usually look forward to each working 
day at my school.”  Since this question was only asked in 2012 and 2013, I develop a broader 
group of intrinsic motivation-related questions through an exploratory factor analysis of survey 






grouping together items that have a factor loading of at least 0.6 on one category and less than 
0.4 on the others.  I consider the category that contains the “look forward” question as the one 
most closely related to intrinsic motivation.  The other two categories appear to contain questions 
that are broadly related to teacher collaboration and school safety.  To estimate the effect of the 
bonus program on teachers’ survey responses, I fit the equation shown below using Ordinary 
Least Squares: 
  
                                     (1.2) 
where 
                       (1.3) 
 
Here     is the average teacher score on the intrinsic motivation questions for school   in 
year  ,     is the average score on non-intrinsic motivation questions, and     is the difference 
between the two.  With    set to zero,    provides the straightforward difference-in-differences 
(DD) estimate where the first difference is between the two types of survey questions and the 
second difference is between the treatment and control group. Unlike the canonical DD model, 
neither difference is related to time, though I add a time dimension in two ways.  First, I include 
the pre-treatment value of the difference in survey scores,          , as a variable on the right-
hand side of the equation.  Second, I recalculate the dependent variable as the difference between 
the current year difference and the 2007 difference, thus estimating a triple-difference model. 
 
1.2.3 Regression Discontinuity Design 






Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design, taking advantage of the rigid discontinuity in school 
eligibility for the bonus program.  Prior to randomization, 430 high-need schools were selected 
to be eligible for the bonus program based on their peer index on the NYC Progress Report.
10
  
These bonus-eligible schools – a subset of all 1,217 NYC schools that received a Progress Report 
in 2007 – were selected entirely based on their Progress Report peer index.  Within each of five 
school types – elementary, K-8, middle, high, and transfer – schools above a particular peer 
index score were chosen to be eligible for the teacher bonus program and schools below that 
score were ineligible.
11
  Conceptually, an RD design compares bonus-eligible schools just above 
the peer index cut point to bonus-ineligible schools just below the cut point.  Assuming that 
bonus-ineligible schools just below the cut point present a valid counterfactual for bonus-eligible 
schools just above the cut point, once the peer index (i.e. forcing variable) is controlled for, any 
difference in outcomes reflects the impact of being eligible for the bonus program. 
 I use several specifications to implement the RD design based on the equation below: 
 
                         (                 )                                         (1.4) 
 
In Equation 1.4,        is the average math or ELA test score for school   in year  ,    is an 
indicator for whether school   was among original 430 bonus-eligible schools with one 
indicating eligible and zero indicating ineligible, and (                 ) is a polynomial 
function of the school’s peer index in 2007, the forcing variable by which school eligibility for 
the bonus program was determined.   The polynomial function is interacted with    to allow it to 
                                                 
10 Note that my study focuses on the 302 elementary, middle, and K-8 schools that had consistent testing data from 
2007 to 2013 and were not barred from participation by the UFT (discussed below). 
11 For middle schools, high schools, and transfer schools, a lower peer index meant a higher-need school.  
Technically, therefore, schools below a certain peer index threshold were eligible for the bonus program.  In this 
analysis, I normalize all peer indices by calculating z-scores within school type and then defining a higher z-score to 






be fit separately on either side of the eligibility cut point.   
 In keeping with recommendations in the RD literature, I estimate various versions of this 
equation (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  I allow  (                 ) to vary from a first through 
fourth order polynomial function and I restrict the sample to bandwidths increasingly close to the 
cut point.  I also run a local linear regression using a triangular kernel (Nichols, 2011).   In the 
tables presented in the main paper, I focus on the results using all of the data where 
 (                 ) is a linear function.  I do this for two reasons.  First, as shown in Figure 
1.3, there appears to be a strong linear relationship between peer index and test scores.  Second, 
the linear regression performs best on “placebo” tests using data from 2006 and 2007, prior to 
the implementation of the bonus program.  Results from the local linear regression – which are 
very similar to those from a full sample linear regression and perform only slightly worse on 
placebo tests – are presented in an appendix. 
 
1.3 Descriptive Results 
1.3.1 Confirmation of Randomization 
 Table 1.2 shows basic demographic and performance characteristics for the treatment 
and control schools during the period prior to the bonus program.  The schools in the study have 
a high proportion of Black or Hispanic students (96%) and a large share of students who qualify 
for free or reduced price lunch.  The average test scores for these schools are substantially below 
the New York City mean, with z-scores of between -0.75 and -0.78, depending on the subject 
and the group.  This lower-than-average performance in the pre-treatment period is consistent 
with the eligibility requirement for the bonus program: schools had to have among the highest 







Table 1.2 – Pre-Bonus Program Characteristics at Treatment and Control Schools 
 
When comparing the 175 treatment schools to the 127 control schools, we see that the 
two groups are balanced along each dimension.  The p-value of a test for the equality of means is 
far from traditional levels of statistical significance for each variable, giving confidence in the 
randomization.
12
  This aligns with prior research into the New York City teacher bonus program, 
which finds evidence consistent with proper randomization (Fryer, 2013; Goodman and Turner, 
2013; Marsh et. al., 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
12 The randomization of schools into the treatment and control groups was conducted by Roland Fryer, who at the 
time was serving as the Chief Equality Officer of the NYCDOE. 
Variable Treatment Control Difference p-Value
% Elementary Schools (2008) 0.64 0.61 0.03 0.59
% Middle Schools (2008) 0.24 0.25 -0.02 0.76
% K-8 Schools (2008) 0.13 0.14 -0.02 0.70
% English Language Learner (2008) 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.85
% Special Education (2008) 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.51
% Free or Reduced Price Lunch (2008) 0.87 0.86 0.01 0.55
% Black or Hispanic (2008) 0.96 0.96 0.00 0.82
Progress Report Peer Index (2007, z-score) 0.93 0.95 -0.02 0.42
Progress Report Overall Score (2008) 53.8 53.6 0.2 0.93
Math Test Score (2007, z-score) -0.75 -0.76 0.00 0.95
Change in Math Score (2006 --> 2007) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.57
ELA Test Score (2007, z-score) -0.78 -0.76 -0.02 0.71
Change in ELA Score (2006 --> 2007) -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.43
Enrollment (2008) 585 574 11 0.70
Count 175 127
Note: the table shows the mean values for the treatment and control schools.  The difference is the 
coefficient of a regression of each variable on a dummy variable for the treatment group.  The 
regression is weighted by enrollment for each of the first nine variables.  The regression is weighted 
by the number of test takers for the following four variables, which represent test score outcomes.  
Variables listed as 2008 are based on an enrollment snapshot from 10/31/07, approximately 






1.3.2 Student Test Scores 
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of school-wide average math and ELA test scores in the 
treatment and control groups.  As before, the test scores are measured in z-scores, standardized 
based on the NYC-wide mean and school-level standard deviation within each year/grade/subject 
combination.  The left side of the chart shows the distribution in 2007, prior to the 
implementation of the bonus program.  In both subjects, the treatment and control groups appear 
to be fairly similar to one another.  Both distributions are centered below zero, consistent with 
the selection criteria for the program.   
The right side of the figure shows the distributions in 2011, the first year after the bonus 
program was suspended.  We can see that both the treatment and control distributions have 
widened when compared to 2007.  In particular, the distributions have expanded to the right 
somewhat, with a larger number of schools having above average test scores (z-score > 0).  
Given that schools were selected to be eligible for the study based on their low incoming 
achievement levels and high-need demographic characteristics from 2007, it makes sense that by 
2011, the schools would be less similar to one another (within each group).  Since both groups of 
schools were, by definition, among the lowest achieving schools in 2007, their standing relative 
to all NYC schools would tend to improve over time due to simple mean reversion. 
 We can also see that by 2011, the treatment group distribution is below the control group 
distribution.  This is true for both subjects and appears to be true across the majority of the 
distribution (i.e. the shape of the two graphs are fairly similar).  While clearly visible, the 
difference between the two distributions is small, representing what appears to be a fraction of 


















1.3.3 Teacher Surveys 
 In addition to validating randomization, when analyzing the teacher survey, we must 
also address the possibility of response bias.  While it is administered as a census, teachers are 
not required to take the survey and not all do.  Since it was first administered in 2007, the overall 
teacher response rate has increased from 44% to 83%.  To test whether the bonus program itself 
had an influence on teacher response rates, I run a simple regression along the lines of Equation 








Table 1.3 – Teacher Response Rates to the NYC School Survey 
 
 
In Table 1.3, the coefficients show the percentage point difference in response rates 
between the treatment and control groups.  When looking at the regression without controls in 
the first row, none of the differences are statistically significant.  We can see, however, that the 
point estimate for the treatment effect in 2007 – prior to the start of the bonus program – is 
negative, while the point estimate for 2010 is positive.  In the second row, I control for 2007 
survey scores in each regression, which leads the 2010 coefficient to become a positive and 
statistically significant 4.7 percentage points.  Overall, there is some evidence that teacher 
response rates increased at bonus-eligible schools during the bonus program – perhaps 
unsurprising since teacher surveys played a small role in determining whether a school won a 
bonus – but no evidence of a lasting effect.  In the three years since the bonus program ended, 
the difference between teacher response rates at treatment and control schools has been 
indistinguishable from zero.   
 
Pre-Pgm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D i  Coefficient 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Teacher, No Controls -0.029 -0.014 0.022 0.038 0.010 0.005 0.008
(0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
Teacher, Control for 2007 -0.002 0.036 0.047** 0.022 0.013 0.017
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
N 299 302 302 302 302 299 302
Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression with school-level teacher survey response rate as 
the dependent variable and treatment (Di) as the independent variable.  Regressions with controls adjust for 
the survey response rate in 2007.  Regressions are weighted by the number of responders at each school.  







1.3.4 Regression Discontinuity Design 
A necessary condition for the validity of an RD design is that the forcing variable 
influences assignment to treatment.  Figure 1.2 shows this to be the case for the NYC teacher 
bonus program.  The x-axis shows the distance from the peer index cut point in units of standard 
deviation, where schools are grouped into bins of width 0.1.  The y-axis shows the percentage of 
schools in each bin that were invited to participate in the bonus program.  No schools below the 
eligibility cut point were invited to participate in the bonus program and slightly more than 50% 
of schools above the eligibility cut point were invited to participate.   
 








Figure 1.3 – Test Scores by Distance from Peer Index Cut Point 
Math (Treatment, 2007) 
 
Math (Control, 2007) 
 
 
ELA (Treatment, 2007) 
 
 
ELA (Control, 2007)  
 
 
 A second condition for the validity of an RD design is that observations (in this case, 
schools) do not have precise control over the assignment variable (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  One 
test is to compare pre-treatment covariates to the forcing variable.  This is shown for one 
important covariate – the average 2007 test score – in Figure 1.3.   As in Figure 1.2, the x-axis 
shows the forcing variable – the peer index – grouped into bins of size 0.1.  The left panel of 
Figure 1.3 restricts eligible schools to be those in the treatment group while the right panel 






fit separately on either side of the cutoff and is superimposed on the scatterplot.  For both groups 
and subjects, we can see a strong negative relationship between peer index and average math test 
scores prior to the introduction of the bonus program.  The relationship appears to be fairly linear 
and, as we would expect, has no notable discontinuity at the cut point for bonus program 
eligibility.   
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1. Student Test Scores 
 To test for results consistent with a loss of intrinsic motivation among teachers, I first 
look at student test scores.  Table 1.4 shows the results of 30 separate regressions, each fit using 
Equation 1.1.
13
  In each regression, the dependent variable is a school’s average test score in 
math or ELA, measured in units of standard deviation.  The sample of schools is restricted to be 
those that were eligible to for randomization into the bonus program.  In the rows labeled “No 
Controls,” the regression is run on a constant and a single indicator variable that is equal to one if 
a school was randomly selected to be part of the treatment group and zero otherwise.  In the rows 
labeled “With Controls,” additional independent variables are added to the regression to control 
for pre-treatment test scores and demographic variables.  In all cases, the coefficients should be 
viewed as Intention to Treat (ITT) estimates as most (87%), but not all, invited schools elected to 
participate in the program (Marsh et al., 2011). 
 In Table 1.4, as expected, we see no impact of the bonus program on student test scores 
prior to the implementation of the program.  In both 2006 and 2007, all coefficient estimates are 
close to zero, with three positive and three negative.  These results serve as a placebo test and, in 
combination with Table 1.2, provide evidence that the randomization procedure was effective.  
                                                 






While adding controls to the regression in 2007 reduces the size of the standard error, it does not 




Table 1.4 – Impact of the Bonus Program on Average Student Test Scores 
 
 During the treatment period – corresponding to the years 2008 through 2010 – we see a 
small but growing negative estimate of the teacher bonus program effect (often not statistically 
distinguishable from zero).  In math, by 2010, treatment schools have test scores that are 0.12 
standard deviations lower than control schools in the baseline specification and 0.13 standard 
                                                 
14 It is not possible control for pre-treatment test scores in the 2006 regression because 2006 is the first year for 
which the NYCDOE provides test score data on its web site. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D i  Coefficient 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Math, No Controls -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12* -0.14* -0.16** -0.14*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Math, With Controls 0.02 -0.04 -0.09** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.13**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
ELA, No Controls 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13** -0.11* -0.12*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
ELA, With Controls -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12** -0.08* -0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R-Squared
Math, No Controls 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Math, With Controls 0.77 0.78 0.63 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.43
ELA, No Controls 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
ELA, With Controls 0.75 0.73 0.59 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.44
N 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302
Pre-Program Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression with school-level mean test score as the dependent 
variable and treatment (Di) as the key independent variable.  Regressions with controls adjust for the average test 
score in the same subject in 2007 (or 2006 in the case when the 2007 test score is the dependent variable), the 
Progress Report Overall Score in 2007 (excluded in the case when the 2007 test score is the dependent variable), 
the Progress Report Peer Index in 2007, indicators for the school level (K8, ES, MS) in 2008, and the percentage of 
students in 2008 who were: English Language Learners, Special Education, eligible for  free or reduced price 
lunches, and black or Hispanic.  Regressions are weighted by the number of test takers in each school.  Robust 






deviations lower in the specification with controls.  The former estimate is significant at the 0.10 
level and the latter at the 0.01 level.  The increased statistical significance in the regression with 
controls is largely caused by a reduction in the standard error, as the coefficient changes little.  In 
ELA, we see negative coefficients throughout the 2008 to 2010 time period that are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero.  These results are broadly consistent with those of other 
researchers who have studied the effect of the NYC teacher bonus program on student outcomes, 
despite the fact that two studies (Marsh et. al., 2011; Fryer, 2013) use individual student data and 
one (Goodman and Turner, 2013) explores only the first two years of the program. 
 With respect to student test scores, one contribution of this paper is to extend the 
analysis beyond the conclusion of the teacher bonus program and look for results consistent with 
a loss of intrinsic motivation.  In the last three columns of Table 1.4 – corresponding to the years 
2011 to 2013 – we see such results.  In math, the negative point estimates become larger in 
magnitude and more strongly statistically significant.  In the uncontrolled regression, the math 
point estimate reaches a low point at -0.16 standard deviations in 2012.   In ELA, the negative 
point estimates roughly double in magnitude between 2010 and 2011 and become statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, whether or not one includes controls to improve precision.  In the 
uncontrolled regression, the ELA point estimate reaches a low of -0.13 standard deviations in 
2011, the year immediately following the conclusion of the bonus program. 
 These results are consistent with a story in which the introduction of the teacher bonus 
program reduced intrinsic motivation among teachers at the treatment schools.  However, these 
results could be consistent with other potential explanations.  Perhaps the bonus program caused 
teachers at treatment schools to change their practice in a way that was detrimental to student 






program through news reports – increased their productivity in an effort to compete with 
treatment schools and prove that merit pay doesn’t improve performance in New York City. 
 
1.4.2 Teacher Survey Responses 
To further explore whether the observed test score results are caused by a decline in 
teachers’ intrinsic motivation, I analyze teachers’ responses to the NYC School Survey.  As 
discussed earlier, teachers’ responses were converted to Likert-like scale with 0 corresponding to 
the most negative response and 10 to the most positive.  Each school received a score for each 
question in each year when that question was asked.  Table 1.5 shows the impact of the bonus 
program on teacher responses to one sample question, where teachers were asked for their 
agreement with the following statement: “I usually look forward to each working day at my 
school.” It is fit using a simplified version of Equation 1.3, where     corresponds to school  ’s 
score on the question in year  .  While this question was only asked in 2012 and 2013, two and 
three years after the completion of the bonus program, respectively, it is arguably the most direct 
measure of intrinsic motivation on the survey. 
 
Table 1.5 – Impact of the Bonus Program on Teacher Agreement with the Statement: “I usually 





Di Coefficient -0.22 -0.04
(0.15) (0.15)
N 297 301
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression with teacher scores 
as the dependent variable and treatment (D i) as the independent variable.  
Regressions are weighted by the number of responders at each school.  Robust 






 The coefficients are both negative – indicating that teachers at treatment schools were 
less likely to agree with this statement – but they are statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
For context, in 2012 this question had a mean score of 7.01 and a standard deviation of 1.22 in 
the control group.   To better understand the trajectory of survey responses before, during, and 
after the bonus program, I focus on the 45 questions that were consistently asked on the teacher 
survey between 2007 and 2012.  I divide these questions into those related and unrelated to 
intrinsic motivation in two ways.  First, I subjectively divide them based on whether or not I 
consider the question to be related to intrinsic motivation (see Table A.1.1 in the appendix for a 
full list).  Second, I conduct an exploratory factor analysis using data from the 2012 survey and 
identify those questions that measure the same underlying construct as the “look forward” 
question shown in Table 1.5.    
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D i  Coefficient 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Intrinsic Motivation Questions -0.16 -0.08 0.05 -0.07 -0.24** -0.23**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Other Questions -0.15 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 -0.25** -0.23*
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Difference (Intrinsic - Other) -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
N 299 302 302 302 302 297
Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression of the mean school-level teacher survey 
scores as the dependent variable and treatment (D i) as the independent variable.  Regressions are 
weighted by the number of responders at each school.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 






 Tables 1.6 shows the results when questions are subjectively divided into those that are, 
and are not, related to intrinsic motivation.  In the top row, we see that the treatment group had 
intrinsic motivation survey scores similar to the control group both before and during the bonus 
program.  In 2011 and 2012, after the bonus program concluded, the intrinsic motivation survey 
scores for the treatment group were between 0.23 and 0.24 points lower than for the control 
group, a result that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  This fact, taken alone, is 
consistent with a reduction in teachers’ intrinsic motivation at schools invited to participate in eh 
bonus program.  However, in the second row of the table, we see a very similar pattern emerge 
among questions that are unrelated to intrinsic motivation.  In the third row, we see results from 
a difference-in-differences regression where the first difference is between the treatment and 
control group and the second difference is between those questions related to intrinsic motivation 
and those that are unrelated.
15
  In this row, we see precisely estimated zeros, indicating that it is 
unlikely that the bonus program had a greater effect on teacher responses to intrinsic motivation 
questions than on teacher responses to other questions. 
 In Table 1.7, I show a similar set of regressions coefficients where the survey questions 
have been divided based on the results of an exploratory factor analysis.  Those labeled “Intrinsic 
Motivation Questions” in Table 1.5 are a set of 18 questions that loaded onto the same factor as 
the “look forward” question discussed above.  As a comparison group, in row 2, I select a group 
of six questions that load onto a factor that appears to be related to school safety.
16
  The results in 
Table 1.7 are very similar to those in Table 1.6, though the coefficients are less precisely 
                                                 
15 This specification is not a standard difference-in-differences regression, since neither difference is related to time.  
In the appendix, however, I take time into account in two ways.  First, I estimate a model that controls for pre-
program scores in 2007.  Second, I use a triple-difference model where the first difference is between treatment and 
control, the second difference is between intrinsic motivation questions and non-intrinsic motivation questions, and 
the third difference is between each year and 2007.  Once 2007 is controlled for, the results in rows 1 and 2 are 
similar in direction but no longer statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The results in row 3 continue to be 
precisely-estimated zeros. 






estimated.  In both tables, it appears that the participating in the bonus program may have had a 
negative effect on teacher survey scores in 2011 and 2012.  However there is no indication that 
intrinsic motivation was more affected than other attitudes measured on the survey.   
 
Table 1.7 – Intrinsic Motivation Questions vs. Other Questions (Factor Analysis Division) 
 
 
1.4.3 Regression Discontinuity Evidence 
In the test score and survey results shown above, I present the estimated coefficients on a 
treatment indicator – equal to 1 for treatment schools and 0 for control schools – rather than on a 
control indicator.  Doing so implicitly suggests that results at the treatment schools declined 
relative to their counterfactual.  However, it is also plausible that the treatment schools held 
steady – on the path they would have had the bonus program not been implemented – and the 
control schools improved.  To test for such a phenomenon, which would be inconsistent with a 
decline in intrinsic motivation among treatment teachers, I use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
Pre-Pgm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D i  Coefficient 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Intrinsic Motivation Questions -0.20 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.27* -0.27*
(0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
School Safety Questions -0.19 -0.16 -0.08 -0.21* -0.25* -0.25*
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Difference (Intrinsic - Safety) -0.01 0.10 0.15 0.15 -0.02 -0.01
(0.16) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
N 299 302 302 302 302 297
Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression of the mean school-level teacher survey 
scores as the dependent variable and treatment (D i) as the independent variable.  Regressions are 
weighted by the number of responders at each school.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 







 To implement the RD study, I take advantage of the rigid discontinuity in school 
eligibility for the bonus program.  Prior to randomization, 430 high-need schools were selected 
to be eligible for the bonus based on their peer index on the NYC Progress Report.
17
  These 
bonus-eligible schools – a subset of all 1,217 NYC schools that received a Progress Report in 
2007 – were selected entirely based on their Progress Report peer index.  Within each of five 
school types – elementary, K-8, middle, high, and transfer – schools above a particular peer 
index score were chosen to be eligible for the teacher bonus program and schools below that 
score were ineligible.
18
  Conceptually, for an RD study, I want to compare bonus-eligible schools 
just above the peer index cut point to bonus-ineligible schools just below the cut point.  
Assuming that bonus-ineligible schools just below the cut point present a valid counterfactual for 
bonus-eligible schools just above the cut point, once the peer index (i.e. forcing variable) is 
controlled for, any difference in outcomes reflects the impact of being eligible for the bonus 
program. 
While the 302 elementary, middle, and K-8 schools I use in my main analysis are valid 
for an RCT, there are two adjustments I need to make to ensure the validity of the RD.  First, as 
documented in Fryer (2013), prior to randomization, 34 bonus-eligible schools were barred by 
the teachers’ union (UFT) for “unknown reasons.”  I add back the 15 elementary, middle, and K-
8 schools among these 34 to ensure that any effect found by the RD is not caused by the UFT 
excluding these schools from the eligible group (since they made no similar exclusion among the 
                                                 
17 Note that my study focuses on the 302 elementary, middle, and K-8 schools that had consistent testing data from 
2007 to 2013 and were not barred from participation by the UFT. 
18 For middle schools, high schools, and transfer schools, a lower peer index meant a higher-need school.  
Technically, therefore, schools below a certain peer index threshold were eligible for the bonus program.  In this 
analysis, I normalize all peer indices by calculating z-scores within school type and then defining a higher z-score to 






ineligible group).  Second, schools that spanned the middle and high school grades had two 
chances to become bonus-eligible, since they received a separate peer index for their middle and 
high school portions, and qualified if either peer index was above the cutoff.  Prior to the RD, I 
remove all schools that received both middle and high school peer indices from the analysis, 
whether or not they appeared in the bonus-eligible group.  This reduced the bonus-eligible group 
by six schools and the non-eligible group by 24 schools.  In total, this leaves 311 bonus-eligible 
elementary, middle, and K-8 schools which I compare to 607 non-eligible schools. 
 
Figure 1.4 – Test Scores by Distance from Peer Index Cut Point (2011) 
Math (Treatment, 2011) 
 
Math (Control, 2011) 
 
 
ELA (Treatment, 2011) 
 
 









 Figure 1.4 presents the results of the RD graphically for 2011, the first year after the 
bonus program was concluded.  The graph is organized in the same way as Figure 1.3, with math 
test scores on the top and ELA test scores on the bottom.  In all four panels, to the left of the 
dotted line we see average test scores for schools that were not eligible for randomization based 
on their peer index.  These schools serve as the counterfactual for bonus-eligible schools.  In the 
left two panels, which compare non-eligible schools to treatment schools, we do not see a 
notable discontinuity in 2011 test scores between the two groups.  To the extent there is any 
discontinuity, it appears that treatment schools may have outperformed non-eligible schools.   In 
the right two panels, which compare non-eligible schools to control schools, we see a more 
noticeable discontinuity.  In particular, control schools near the cut point – just to the right of the 
dotted line – appear to have higher 2011 average test scores than would be predicted based on 
their peer index.  
Table 1.8 provides regression results to support the visual evidence in Figure 1.4.  Each 
entry in Table 1.8 shows the coefficient and standard error for   – a dummy variable indicating 
eligibility to be randomized for the teacher bonus program – from a linear regression to fit 
Equation 1.4.  As explained above, I fit a linear regression model because the data – even in the 
pre-program period – have a strong linear relationship and higher-order polynomials appear to 
overfit the data, failing the placebo tests. Consistent with the recommendation of Gelman and 
Imbens (2014), I also present RD results using a local linear regression in an appendix, and the 
results are very similar to those presented in Table 1.8.   
 
In Table 1.8, we see that eligibility for the bonus program had no impact on test scores in 






and 2007). This result, consistent with the visual evidence in Figure 1.3, serves as a falsification 
test.  In the top two rows of Table 1.8, we see little evidence of an effect of the bonus program on 
treatment school test scores after the program began in 2008.  The treatment-school estimates are 
generally fairly small and not significantly different from zero.  If anything, the coefficients are 
somewhat more likely to be positive than negative, a finding that is inconsistent with what one 
would expect if teachers’ intrinsic motivation had declined. 
 
Table 1.8 – Impact of Bonus Eligibility on Student Test Scores (Regression Discontinuity) 
 
 The bottom two rows of Table 1.8 restrict the eligible sample to control schools only.  
When running the RD, I am then comparing ineligible schools – which never had the opportunity 
to be randomized into the bonus program – with eligible schools that were randomly selected to 
be control schools.  In Table 1.8, we see that control schools right around the eligibility cut point 
had significantly higher test scores than ineligible schools with similar peer indices.  Between 
E s (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coefficient 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 N = 
Math, Treatment -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.05 793
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
ELA, Treatment 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.14* 0.11 0.02 -0.04 793
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Math, Control 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16* 0.17* 0.28*** 0.24** 0.09 745
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
ELA, Control 0.08 0.07 0.15** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.15** 0.08 745
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Pre-Program Program Post-Program
Note: Each number is the coefficient on Es in a separate regression of school-level mean test score 
on distance from the eligiblity cut point, an indicator for bonus eligiblity (Es), and an interaction of the 
two (allowing the slopes to vary on either side of the cut point).    Regressions are weighted by the 
number of test takers in each school.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample size is 
the same in each year because only schools with testing data in each year were included.  *** 






2009 and 2012, the estimated coefficients range from 0.15 to 0.28 school-level standard 
deviations, and all results are significant at the 0.10 level with most significant at the 0.05 level.  
These results – when combined with the null effects observed in treatment schools – provide 
more nuance to the negative RCT results highlighted earlier in this paper.  It appears that the 
negative impact of the bonus program was not so much the result of a decline in performance 
among treatment schools, but rather of an improvement in performance among control schools. 
 
Table 1.9 – Comparison of RD and RCT Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
A. RD (Treatment Schools)
Math (All Schools) -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.07 -0.05
ELA (All Schools) 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.14* 0.11 0.02 -0.04
B. RD (Control Schools)
Math (All Schools) 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16* 0.17* 0.28*** 0.24** 0.09
ELA (All Schools) 0.08 0.07 0.15** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.15** 0.08
C. Treatment - Control
Math (All Schools) -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.17 -0.14
ELA (All Schools) -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13 -0.12
D. RCT Results (Treatment Effect)
Math, No Controls -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12* -0.14* -0.16** -0.14*
ELA, No Controls 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13** -0.11* -0.12*
Sample Size
Panel A (Treatment) 793 793 793 793 793 793 793 793
Panel B (Control) 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745
Pre-Program Program Post-Program
Note: Each number in Panel A and B is the coefficient on a separate regression of school-level mean test 
score on distance from the eligiblity cut point, an indicator for bonus eligiblity (Ei), and an interaction of the 
two (allowing the slopes to vary on either side of the cut point).  Panel A restricts eligible schools to include 
treatment schools only.  Panel B restricts eligible schools to include control schools only.  Panel C shows the 
difference between the estimates in Panel A and Panel B.  Panel D reproduces the treatment coefficient 
from the "no control" regressions in Table 2.   Regressions are weighted by the number of test takers in each 






 Table 1.9 shows the degree to which the RD and RCT results align with one another.  In 
Panel A and B, I replicate the coefficients from Table 1.8, omitting standard errors for clarity.  In 
Panel C, I subtract the RD coefficients for control schools from the RD coefficients for treatment 
schools, obtaining one estimate of the difference between treatment and control schools.  These 
estimates are very close to the RCT results from Table 1.4, which I have replicated (for the 
regression with no controls) in Panel D of Table 1.9.  While the RCT and the RD show largely 
the same estimated difference between the treatment and control group, the RD gives us more 
insight into the cause of this difference.  Rather than a decline in performance among treated 
schools – as would be consistent with a decline in teachers’ intrinsic motivation – it appears 
likely that control schools improved their performance over what would have happened in the 
absence of the bonus program.   
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 In this paper, I test whether the implementation of a large teacher bonus program in New 
York City had a detrimental effect on teachers’ intrinsic motivation.  Initially reviewing data 
from the Randomized Controlled Trial, I find some evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
Teachers at treatment schools responded more negatively to questions related to intrinsic 
motivation and students at treatment schools scored lower on standardized tests than their 
counterparts at randomly assigned control schools.  However, exploring further, it appears 
unlikely that a decline in teachers’ intrinsic motivation drove these results.  When looking at 
teacher survey scores, we see that scores at treatment schools dropped by a similar amount for 
questions unrelated to intrinsic motivation.  And when looking at student test scores, a 






decline relative to their (unobserved) counterfactual, as would be predicted if the bonus program 
lowered teachers’ intrinsic motivation.  Rather, it appears that students at control schools scored 
higher than their (also unobserved) counterfactual. 
 While this finding is unexpected, it is not infeasible.  Given the public nature of the 
bonus program, it is possible that teachers at control schools knew that they were working in 
control schools and made an effort to improve their performance.  The bonus program was 
widely publicized when it was implemented, and the NYCDOE published a full list of invited 
treatment schools that, if combined with information on the peer index, would have enabled 




  Moreover, it has 
been widely observed that the behavior of experimental units may change once they are aware 
they are participating in a study, a phenomenon broadly referred to as a Hawthorne Effect.  Once 
specific form is known as the “John Henry Effect,” in which experimental participants are aware 
that they are in the control group and seek to work harder as a result.  Such an effect, if it took 
place during the NYC teacher bonus program, might explain the results observed in this paper. 
 More broadly, the RD results serve as an important reminder when interpreting RCT 
results.  An RCT is generally considered the “gold standard” for causal evidence in the social 
sciences because the control group is assumed to be a valid counterfactual for the treatment 
group.  The control group answers the question: what would have happened to the treatment 
group had the experiment not be implemented?  However, the results in this paper remind us 
that, even in an RCT, the treatment group counterfactual is never actually observed.  Even with 
proper randomization, as by all accounts occurred in the NYC teacher bonus program, the 
                                                 
19 See, for example, a New York Times article in 2008 announcing the distribution of $14.2 million dollars to 
teachers after the first year of the program (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/education/19bonus.html) 
20 The announcement with the list of invited treatment schools was available at the following link until recently: 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Offices/mediarelations/NewsandSpeeches/2007-2008/20071218_performance_pay.htm.  I 






control group is still an imperfect estimate of what would have happened in the treatment group 








2. Moral Hazard and Less Invasive Medical Treatment for Coronary Artery Disease: The 
Case of Cigarette Smoking 














 Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) is a common and deadly disease.  In 2010, over 
350,000 people died of CAD in the United States, making the disease responsible for roughly 
one in seven deaths (Murphy, Xu, and Kochanek, 2012).  CAD is caused by a buildup of plaque 
on the arterial walls leading to the heart, resulting in reduced blood flow.  If the buildup is not 
checked, CAD can result in an acute myocardial infarction (AMI, a.k.a. “heart attack”) due to 
insufficient oxygen reaching the heart. 
 A number of medical treatments are available to patients with CAD.  First, and least 
invasive, is “medical management.”  Medical management involves non-surgical treatment 
including prescription medication, lifestyle modification, and frequent monitoring.  The second 
treatment is a revascularization procedure known as Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI, 
commonly referred to as angioplasty).  A doctor (usually an interventional cardiologist) 
performing PCI makes a small incision and arthroscopically inserts and inflates a balloon at the 
site of the lesion to expand the vessel.  PCI in the modern era usually involves the placement of a 
wire mesh stent at the blockage site, which assists in keeping the arterial walls expanded to 
maintain blood flow.  The PCI procedure takes approximately 60 minutes and the patient usually 
                                                 
21 Research for this paper was supported by grant number 5R21 AG033876 from the National Institute on Aging 
and the Office of Behavioral and Social Sciences Research to the National Bureau of Economic Research. This 
paper was presented at seminars at the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois at Chicago, Johns Hopkins 
University, the University of Melbourne, the Ohio State University, the University of Connecticut, the University of 
Delaware, the Weill Cornell Medical School, Columbia University, and Washington State University.  It also was 
presented at the 2013 Bureau of the Census Research Data Centers Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, at the 2014 spring meeting of the National Bureau of Economic Research Health Economics Program, and 
at the Fifth Biennial Conference of the American Society of Health Economists at the University of Southern 
California in June 2014.  We would like to thank the participants in those forums for helpful comments and 
suggestions.  We also would like to thank Peter Cram and John O’Grady for their medical insights and Sandra 
Decker for her advice on working with the linked NHIS/Medicare data.  We are indebted to Jonathan Fisher, 
Research Data Center (RDC) Administrator at the New York Bureau of the Census RDC at Baruch College, and 
Frances McCarty, Senior Service Fellow at the National Center for Health Statistics RDC, for their assistance in 






spends one night in the hospital.
22
  The third and generally most invasive treatment is Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft (CABG)
23
, a major surgical procedure that involves harvesting a section of 
vessel from a different area of the body (either vessels in the groin or chest wall), opening the 
chest cavity via a sternectomy, and connecting one healthy part of the diseased artery to another, 
surgically bypassing the lesion.  CABG surgery takes approximately four hours and patients 
generally spend at least a week recovering in the hospital.
24
  
 Of the two procedures, PCI was developed more recently, having been initially used in 
the late 1970s, more than a decade after CABG was first performed.  Its use expanded rapidly 
upon FDA approval of the coronary stent in 1994 (Cutler and Huckman, 2003).  By 2010, the 
CDC estimated that there were 954,000 PCI procedures and 395,000 CABG procedures 




Since the development of PCI, there have been numerous studies comparing the 
effectiveness of the two procedures in various populations (see Hlatky et al., 2009, Weintraub et 
al., 2012, and Mohr et al., 2013 for three recent studies that summarize prior research).  While 
the results vary, the emerging consensus is that CABG patients have worse short-run outcomes 
than similar PCI patients – partly due to higher perioperative mortality – but better long-term 
outcomes.  Results from a large observational study (Weintraub et al., 2012) are reproduced in 
Figure 2.1, showing that the survival curve for CABG patients is initially lower than for PCI 
patients, but that this trend is reversed a year or more after the procedure.  A meta-analysis of ten 
                                                 
22 http://www.medicinenet.com/coronary_angioplasty/article.htm (accessed 3/12/15) 
23 Less invasive CABG procedures have been in development and increasing use in recent years, though these were 
very infrequent during the period we examine. 
24 http://www.medicinenet.com/coronary_artery_bypass_graft/article.htm (accessed 3/12/15) 
25 These counts are based on ICD-9-CM procedure codes beginning with 361 for CABG and 0066, 3606, and 3607 
for PCI.  Note that the PCI codes used by the CDC to estimate the number of procedures are slightly different than 






randomized controlled trials shows a similar pattern (Hlatky et al., 2009). 
Figure 2.1 – Comparative Effectiveness: PCI vs. CABG (Weintraub et al., 2012) 
 
 
 While studies show that otherwise similar CABG patients have better long run outcomes 
than PCI patients, there is little consensus as to why.
26
  In this paper, we propose a novel 
hypothesis: patient offsetting behavior.  Specifically, a patient who undergoes CABG rather than 
PCI is more likely to change her behavior in a way that promotes good health and a longer life: 
she is more likely to quit smoking, begin exercising, improve her diet, and avoid excessive 
alcohol intake.  This might happen because the more invasive nature of CABG – a patient’s heart 
                                                 
26 Most authors either omit a discussion of mechanisms entirely (e.g. Weintraub et al., 2012) or imply that CABG 
may have mechanical benefits in the long run.  For example, in commenting on the superiority of CABG in the 
recent SYNTAX randomized trial, Taggart (2013, p. 606) states that “… CABG and PCI achieve their benefits 
through quite different pathophysiological effects. Pathologically, most coronary artery disease is located in the 
proximal coronary arteries and bypass grafts to the mid-coronary vessels not only make the complexity of proximal 
disease irrelevant but also offer prophylaxis against the development of de-novo proximal disease. By contrast, 
although PCI can be highly effective in directly treating less complex proximal coronary artery disease, its benefits 
are mitigated by the development of new disease proximal to, within, or immediately distal to the stent….” 




















and lungs are bypassed during the surgery, she is in the hospital for a week, has a longer post-
operative recovery period, and is left with a major scar and residual pain from the sternectomy – 
sends a stronger signal to the patient that she has a serious health problem.   
This hypothesis is consistent with a prior economic research on moral hazard, showing 
that individuals change their behavior when their perceived risks change.  Peltzman’s (1975) 
study of the effects of automobile safety regulation is a classic and seminal example.  He 
develops a model in which the legal mandate to install various safety devices on automobiles 
lowers the price of fast and reckless driving because it lowers the probability that the driver will 
die in an accident.  Hence, the demand for this activity rises.  Empirically, he finds that the 
increase in this offsetting behavior (reckless driving) is so large that the regulations at issue had 
little impact on highway deaths and actually increased pedestrian deaths.  More recently, Dave 
and Kaestner (2009) investigate the impact of health insurance access on health behaviors of the 
elderly, showing that access to Medicare at age 65 leads to a reduction in preventative behaviors 
and an increase in risky health behavior amongst the elderly.  Peltzman (2011) demonstrates how 
medical technology breakthroughs can lead to offsetting behavior by showing that the age 
cohorts that benefited the most from the introduction of antibiotics experienced worse mortality 
rates from risky health behaviors.  Kaestner, Darden, and Lakdawalla (2014) find that the use of 
statins leads to a small increase in body mass index and moderate (20–33 percent) increases in 
the probability of being obese, possibly because it changes the user’s perceived risk of 
consuming high calorie fattening foods. 
 In this study, we test one potential behavioral response to surgery – smoking – and see 
results consistent with patient offsetting behavior.  Patients who undergo CABG – the more 






Our results are robust to a number of different specifications and, for reasons we discuss below, 
unlikely to be driven by selection bias.   
 
2.2 Data 
 We use individual Medicare data merged with responses from the National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS).  The Medicare records identify those patients who have been 
diagnosed with CAD and show which of them have undergone PCI or CABG, along with the 
exact date of each diagnoses and procedure.  The Medicare data also allow us to control for 
disease severity and other conditions that might be correlated with procedure type and induce 
quitting, such as a myocardial infarction (a.k.a. “heart attack”).  The NHIS provides information 
on smoking and quitting behavior, as well as individual characteristics.  
 The Medicare data are provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS).  To identify CAD patients and the type of treatment they underwent, we use the 
Medicare Standard Analytical Files, including the Inpatient, Outpatient, Skilled Nursing Facility, 
Carrier, Durable Medical Equipment, Home Health Agency, and Hospice claims files.  These 
files contain one or more records for each individual.
27
  Each record contains the ICD-9-CM 
codes for all diagnoses made and procedures performed during that stay or claim.  We identify 
CAD patients as those who have at least one diagnosis code beginning with 410, 411, 412, 413, 
or 414. We identify PCI patients as those CAD patients with at least one procedure code 
beginning with 0066, 3601, 3602, 3605, or 3606.  We identify CABG patients as those CAD 
                                                 
27 A single record in the Inpatient file corresponds to a stay in a hospital.  A single record in the Skilled Nursing 
Facility file corresponds to a stay in a Skilled Nursing Facility. A single record in the Outpatient file corresponds to 
a claim by an institutional outpatient provider (Hospital outpatient clinic, rural health clinics, etc.).  A single record 







patients with procedure codes beginning with 361.
28
  Finally, we identify medically managed 
patients as those patients who have been diagnosed with CAD, but do not have a concurrent or 
subsequent PCI or CABG procedure.
29
   
The NHIS is an annual survey of approximately 85,000 individuals in over 30,000 U.S. 
households run by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), part of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  All participants are asked questions about their general 
state of health and disability.  Each year, a subset of approximately 30,000 individuals is asked 
about their smoking habits.  These respondents are asked if they have ever smoked 100 cigarettes 
in their life.  For those who say yes, they are asked if they currently smoke every day, some days, 
or not at all.  If they do not currently smoke, they are asked when they quit, a question they can 
answer in days, weeks, months, or years.  We use the responses to these questions to create a 
synthetic panel, identifying whether a person smoked on each date prior to their NHIS interview.  
Each person is categorized as either an always smoker, a never smoker, or a quitter who smoked 
up to the day she reports quitting.
30 
  
The individual NHIS responses have been linked to Medicare data by the CDC and CMS 
and made available as a restricted-use dataset to researchers. The linkage is based on social 
security number, date of birth, and gender. To be linked, the data must match on all three fields. 
To date, the CDC and CMS have linked the 1994-1998 NHIS surveys to Medicare data from 
1991-2007 and the 1999-2005 NHIS surveys to Medicare data from 1999-2007. The linkage is 
described further in the appendix. 
                                                 
28 For both PCI and CABG, we exclude the small number of patients who do not have a concurrent or prior CAD 
diagnosis. 
29 A patient who is diagnosed with CAD before her NHIS interview date and has PCI or CABG after her NHIS 
interview date is counted as medically managed at the time of the NHIS interview. 
30 This categorization vastly over-simplifies the complexity of smoking and quitting behavior, but still allows us to 
investigate our key question: what is the difference in quitting behavior between CAD patients undergoing medical 






2.3 Initial Analysis 
In total, 12,265 NHIS respondents were linked to Medicare data and diagnosed with 
CAD.
31
  Of these individuals, between the date of their diagnosis and the date of their NHIS 
interview, 10,713 patients were treated only with medical management, 771 patients underwent 
PCI but not CABG surgery, and 781 patients underwent CABG surgery.
32
  Though our focus is 
on the two procedures – PCI and CABG – we include medically managed patients in all analyses 
for two reasons.  First, due to the substantially greater number of medically managed patients, 
including them improves the precision of our covariate estimates (e.g. determining the impact of 
having a heart attack on smoking).  Second, since medical management is the least invasive 
treatment for CAD, we might expect medically managed patients to quit at the lowest rate.  This 
result, which we find in the data, supports our theory that changes in smoking behavior are 
related to treatment invasiveness.  Our main finding, however – that CABG patients quit 
smoking at a higher rate than PCI patients – is robust to excluding medically managed patients 
from the analysis entirely.   
Basic characteristics of the 12,265 CAD patients are shown in Table 2.1.
33
  Overall, when 
compared to patients undergoing medical management, patients who undergo a procedure (PCI 
or CABG) are more likely to be younger, male, and white.  PCI and CABG patients appear to 
have largely similar demographic characteristics, though CABG patients are somewhat more 
likely to be male.  When comparing medical conditions, both PCI and CABG patients are 
substantially more likely than medically managed patients to have had their first Acute 
                                                 
31 To be included, patients had to be diagnosed with CAD after the start of our Medicare data, but before the date of 
their NHIS interview (so that we have information on their smoking behavior both before and after their treatment). 
32 These counts are weighted by the NHIS probability weights.  The unweighted totals are 10,772 medically 
managed patients, 723 PCI patients, and 770 CABG patients.  Unweighted, 99 patients underwent both PCI and 
CABG surgery. These patients are included in the CABG category, because that is the more invasive treatment.  Our 
results are robust to including them in the PCI category or excluding them altogether. 
33 Results presented in this paper include all Medicare participants, regardless of age.  Results excluding those 






Myocardial Infarction (AMI, a.k.a. “heart attack”) within six months of initiating treatment.  A 
number of other comorbidities – including congestive heart failure and valvular disease – show 
up most frequently in CABG patients, followed by PCI patients.  In some of our regression 
specifications, we control for the covariates shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 – Patient Characteristics by Treatment 
 
Demographic Characteristics Medical Conditions
MM PCI CABG MM PCI CABG
Age First AMI Within 6 Months of Treatment*
< 55 4% 4% 2% Yes 8% 40% 37%
55-64 7% 8% 7% No 92% 60% 63%
65-69 24% 25% 26%
70-74 22% 25% 26% % With Comorbidity Within 6 Months of Treatment*
75-79 21% 20% 23% Congestive heart failure 14% 21% 34%
80-84 13% 13% 13% Valvular disease 11% 19% 27%
85+ 8% 5% 2% Pulmonary circulation disorder 2% 4% 4%
Peripheral vascular disorder 10% 18% 22%
Gender Paralysis 1% 1% 3%
Male 44% 53% 59% Other neurological 3% 3% 3%
Female 56% 47% 41% Chronic pulmonary disease 15% 12% 22%
Diabetes w/o chronic comp. 14% 16% 17%
Race Diabetes w/ chronic comp. 4% 7% 10%
Asian 1% 1% 1% Hypothyroidism 7% 6% 5%
Black 9% 6% 4% Renal failure 2% 4% 4%
Hispanic 5% 3% 4% Liver disease 1% 1% 0%
White 85% 89% 90% Chronic Peptic ulcer disease 0% 1% 0%
Mult./Oth/Unknown 1% 1% 1% HIV and AIDS 0% 0% 0%
Lymphoma 0% 0% 0%
Education Metastatic cancer 1% 1% 1%
Elem (K-8) 21% 17% 20% Solid tumor without metastasis 5% 5% 3%
HS (non-grad); GED 19% 23% 18% Rheumatoid arthritis 3% 2% 2%
HS grad 29% 30% 29% Coagulation deficiency 3% 4% 9%
Some col; AA deg. 18% 20% 18% Obesity 3% 8% 9%
BA degree 7% 7% 8% Weight loss 1% 1% 2%
Grad. Degree 5% 5% 6% Fluid and electrolyte disorders 10% 13% 24%
Unknown 1% 0% 1% Blood loss anemia 1% 3% 3%
Deficiency anemias 11% 14% 23%
Family Income Alcohol abuse 1% 1% 1%
$0 to $9,999 19% 15% 14% Drug abuse 0% 0% 0%
$10,000 to $19,999 25% 22% 24% Psychoses 2% 2% 2%
$20,000 to $35,000 20% 24% 24% Depression 4% 7% 6%
$35,000 or over 18% 22% 21% Hypertension 37% 37% 36%
Unknown 18% 17% 17%
Count (N = 12,265) 10,713 771 781 Count (N = 12,265) 10,713 771 781
Note:  All data are weighted by the NHIS probability weights. Age is as of diagnosis (CAD) or procedure (PCI / CABG). 






Table 2.2 shows the smoking status of each group of respondents – medical management, 
PCI, and CABG – as of the date of the NHIS interview.  Two items merit notice.  First, CABG 
and PCI patients are more likely to have ever smoked than medically managed patients (i.e. the 
percentage of respondents who never smoked is lower for CABG and PCI patients).  Second, 
most people who have ever smoked have quit smoking by the time of the NHIS interview, a 
trend that is most pronounced for CABG patients.  While 61.0 percent of CABG patients in our 
study smoked at some point in their life, only 9.1 percent smoke as of their NHIS interview.  PCI 
patients have a lower proportion of quitters, followed by medically managed patients. 
 
Table 2.2 – Smoking Status as of NHIS Interview Date 
 
 
 The data in Table 2.2 are consistent with the broad hypothesis in our study – patients 
who undergo a more invasive treatment for CAD are more likely to quit smoking.  However, 
they could also be consistent with a story in which people who undergo CABG are also more 
likely to quit smoking for reasons unrelated to their surgery.  If our hypothesis is true, we should 
see that the differential quitting behavior between CABG, PCI, and medically managed patients 
is driven by quits that occur close to the date of the treatment. 
 
Smoking Status as of Survey MM PCI CABG Total
Current 12.2% 11.3% 9.1% 11.9%
Quit 42.6% 49.3% 52.0% 43.6%
Never Smoked 45.3% 39.5% 39.0% 44.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count 10,713 771 781 12,265
Treatment
Note: This table shows the smoking status of every NHIS respondent who was diagnosed with CAD prior to 






Table 2.3 – Quitting Within Six Months of Treatment 
 
 
Table 2.3 focuses on those quits that take place immediately around the initiation of 
treatment, where the initiation of treatment is defined to be the diagnosis date for medically 
managed patients and the procedure date for PCI and CABG patients.  The “before” period is 
exactly six months before the treatment date, while the “after” period is exactly six months after 
treatment date.
34
  Among the 10,713 patients diagnosed with CAD who receive only medical 
management, approximately 15.7 percent smoked six months before their diagnosis and 14.2 
percent smoked six months after their diagnosis.  The quitters represent a 1.6 percentage point 
reduction in the number of smokers and a 10.1 percent reduction.  The corresponding numbers 
for PCI are a 2.7 percentage point reduction and a 17.4 percent reduction.  For CABG, they are a 




                                                 
34 Creating a “quit window” around the treatment is necessary for two reasons.  First, it is unlikely that many 
individuals quit on exactly the day their treatment began.  Second, our smoking data, which are based on 
individuals’ recollections, are insufficiently precise to pinpoint the exact day of quitting.  Our conclusions do not 
change with other reasonable definitions of the quit window. 
MM PCI CABG Total
Smoke before treatment 15.7% 15.6% 15.1% 15.7%
Smoke after treatment 14.2% 12.9% 10.5% 13.8%
Percentage Point Change -1.6% -2.7% -4.5% -1.9%
Percent Change (Quit Rate) 10.1% 17.4% 30.1% 11.8%
Count 10,713 771 781 12,265
Treatment
Note: This table includes every NHIS respondent who was diagnosed with CAD in our data prior to their 
interview date.  It shows their smoking status exactly six months before and exactly six months after 






Figure 2.2 – Smoking Rate by Year Relative to Diagnosis (MM) or Procedure (PCI & CABG) 
 
 
Further evidence is provided by Figures 2.2 and 2.3.  In Figure 2.2, we calculate the 
percentage of the population smoking at twelve points in time, measured in years relative to the 
date of diagnosis (in the case of medically managed patients) or procedure (in the case of PCI 
and CABG patients).
35
  In the CABG series, for example, the year -3.5 shows the percentage of 
CABG patients who were smoking exactly three and a half years prior to their procedure date.  In 
the 10 years prior to the treatment date, the three series track each other reasonably closely.  At 
                                                 
35 Because we have data on only the most recent quit date for each individual, we assume that each smoker was 
smoking in all years before their quit date.  Since we are using Medicare data for our analysis, most people are over 
65 when they received their diagnosis or procedure, and it is unlikely that they started smoking for the first time in 
the ten years immediately prior.  It is possible that individuals quit and restarted during this time period, and we do 
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the first point on the graph – 9.5 years before treatment – CABG patients were roughly one 
percentage point more likely than PCI patients to smoke, who were, in turn, roughly one 
percentage point more likely than MM patients to smoke.  In the period immediately prior to 
treatment, the three groups smoked at roughly equal rates.  The differences between the three 
series emerge most starkly in the period immediately after treatment initiation.  Six months after 
their treatment begins, CABG patients were substantially less likely to smoke than either PCI or 
MM patients. 
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Figure 2.3 displays the same data in a different format, showing the annual quit rate for 
patients in each of the three groups relative to the date of treatment.  For the group that received 
only medical management, roughly 5 percent of smokers quit each year in the nine years prior to 
being diagnosed, a rate that doubled to 10 percent during the year of their diagnosis with 
coronary artery disease.  The PCI and CABG series show a similar trend, though they represent 
fewer individuals and are somewhat noisier.  In the years prior to their procedure, roughly 5 
percent of smokers quit each year, though this percentage began to rise the year before the 
procedure date.  During the procedure year – defined to be the six-month window on either side 
of the procedure date – the quit rate jumped to 17 percent for patients receiving PCI and 30 
percent for patients receiving CABG.  In the year following treatment, the quit rate for all three 
groups dropped back to approximately 5 percent.  Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide reasonably 
compelling evidence that at least a portion of the increased quit rate for more invasive treatments 
observed in Table 2.2 is related to treatment received, and not simply a spurious correlation. 
 
2.4 Results 
To further explore the relationship between treatment for coronary artery disease and 
smoking behavior, we fit two related models of quitting smoking.  The first is a discrete time 
linear probability hazard function with 11 periods: 9 before treatment and 2 after.  We fit the 
model using individual data, allowing us to control for time-varying events – like CAD diagnosis 
or a patient’s first AMI – that may occur prior to, concurrent with, or after a PCI or CABG 
procedure.  The second model is a multi-period quit function using grouped data, inspired by 
Donald and Lang (2007).  In this model, we build a synthetic panel, grouping the individual data 






in-differences regressions with 11 data points.   
Before presenting the results of these models, it is useful to point out the relationship 
between a smoking participation function and a quit function.  As an identity
36
 







       (2.1) 
where st and st-1 are the smoking participation rates in periods t and t-1, respectively, and 
qt is the quit rate in the window defined by periods t and t-1.  All rates are defined as fractions 
and can be interpreted as probabilities at the individual level.  Take natural logarithms of the 
identity to obtain 









      (2.2) 
The approximation in the last part of Equation 2.2 is better for smaller values of q (q  
0.2 is generally used as a rule of thumb).  However, even for a quit rate as large as 0.3 (the 
largest rate in our data), ln(1 – q) = - 0.350, which is close to 0.3.  Equation 2.2 indicates that a 
regression in which the first difference of the log of smoking participation is the dependent 
variable should have approximately the same coefficients with the signs reversed as one in which 
                                                 
36 Let St be the number of smokers in period t, and let St-1 be the number of smokers in period t-1.  Let Qt be the 
number of quitters in period t (the number who smoke in period t-1 but do not smoke in period t).  Assume as is the 
case in our data that there are no starters or re-starters.  Then 
   St  St-1 - Qt.        
Divide both sides of the identity by N, the size of the population: 
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the quit rate is the dependent variable.  It also suggests that it is useful to begin with a log 
smoking participation function to arrive at a specification of a quit function.  In particular, if the 
log smoking participation function contains individual fixed effects, these effects are eliminated 
by taking first differences to obtain the quit function. 
 
2.4.1 Discrete-time Linear Probability Hazard Model (Individual Data) 
To implement the first model, we develop a synthetic panel with 12 points in time, as 
shown in Figure 2.2.  For CABG and PCI patients, there are 10 points in time prior to treatment 
(from 9.5 years before to 0.5 years before) and two points in time after treatment (0.5 years after 
and 1.5 years after).  For medically managed (MM) patients, there are the same 10 points in time 
before diagnosis and the same two points in time after diagnosis.  To focus on the key aspects of 
the model, we ignore the socioeconomic and demographic variables for the time being, assume a 
single Elixhauser comorbidity, and suppress the subscript i for an individual.  Let fg be a person-
specific fixed effect.  Let at be a dummy variable that equals 0 at each point in time before 
treatment for PCI or CABG and equals 1 at each point in time after treatment.  Specifically, at 
equals 1 in periods 11 and 12. This variable is not relevant for MM patients (see below).  Let dt 
be a dummy variable that equals 0 at all points in time before diagnosis and equals 1 at all points 
in time after diagnosis.  Let ht be a dummy variable that equals zero before a patient’s first AMI 
(in our data) and equals 1 after a patient’s first AMI.  Finally, let et equal 0 before an Elixhauser 
comorbidity is reported and equals 1 thereafter. 
The log smoking participation model for PCI and CABG patients (g = p or c)   
 







where we assume a linear trend in the absence of treatment.  The model for MM patients is the 
same except that amt coincides with dmt, so that we constrain m to equal zero.  After pooling and 
taking first differences, one obtains 
 
- (ln st – ln st-1)  qt =  + α(dt – dt-1) + pp(at – at-1) + cc(at – at-1) + (ht – ht-1) + (et – et-1).  (2.4) 
 
Strictly speaking, time-invariant individual characteristics, such as formal schooling, can 
only be added to Equation 2.4 by assuming that they interact with the linear trend in Equation 
2.3.  Our results are not affected by allowing the trend to be nonlinear or by allowing individual 
characteristics to interact with the indicator for the period after treatment in addition to their 
interactions with a linear trend.    
 We fit Equation 2.4 as a discrete time linear probability hazard model. We include only 
individuals who smoke at the first point in time for which we compute smoking participation (9.5 
years before treatment or diagnosis), dropping everyone who never smoked or had previously 
quit.  Each person is assigned a qit variable that is equal to one in the period in which they quit 
and zero in all other periods.  Individuals are deleted once they quit.  The model in Equation 2.4 
has at most 11 observations per person corresponding to the 11 time periods in Figure 2.3.  
Individuals who smoke in all periods are the censored observations. The first period is defined by 
the window starting 9.5 years before treatment and ending 8.5 years before treatment. The last 
period is the window from 0.5 years after treatment to 1.5 years after treatment.  The key 
window is period 10 and spans the dates from half a year before treatment or diagnosis to half a 






observations on all persons except those who quit in period 1, we cluster standard errors at the 
individual level.  Standard errors that ignore clustering are, however, very similar to those that 
take account of it.  This would be the case if the unspecified disturbance term in the log smoking 
participation function in Equation 2.3 is a random walk.  In that case, we eliminate serial 
correlation by taking first differences.       
Results are shown in Table 2.4.  Note that After stands for at – at-1, Diagnosed stands 
for dt – dt-1, and AMI stands for ht – ht-1 in the table.  Column 1 shows the simplest 
specification, with controls only for diagnosis with CAD and treatment with either PCI or 
CABG.  The Diagnosed indicator is equal to one in the period when MM patients, PCI patients, 
or CABG patients are diagnosed, whether the diagnosis occurs in the same period as the 
treatment or not.
37
  Being diagnosed with CAD is associated with a 5.0 percentage point increase 
in the probability of quitting, on top of the typical yearly quit rate of 4.9 percent (reflected in the 
coefficient on the constant term).  Being treated with PCI or CABG is associated with an 
incremental 9.0 or 22.5 percentage point increase in the quit rate, respectively.  This assumes that 
diagnosis and treatment occur in the same period.  If not, the diagnosis coefficient must be 
subtracted since Diagnosed equals zero for PCI and CABG patients diagnosed in a period prior 
to their treatment period but equals one for all MM patients.  That results in a 4.0 percentage 
point increase for PCI patients and a 17.5 percentage point increase for CABG patients.  Since 40 
percent of PCI patients and 43 percent of CABG patients are diagnosed before treatment, the 
average percentage point increases in the quit rates are 7.0 and 20.4, respectively.
38
  Regardless 
                                                 
37 In results not shown, we find no evidence of a differential diagnosis effect based on treatment received.  
Therefore, in all results shown, we assume that there is a single diagnosis effect that does not vary by treatment. 
38 For MM patients, the increase in the quit rate is 0.0501.  Since 60 percent of PCI patients are diagnosed in the 
same period as treatment, the average predicted increase in the quit rate for these patients is 0.0897  + 0.60*0.0501 = 
0.1198.  The difference between that increase and the increase for MM patients is 0.0697 or 7.0 percentage points.  






of how these computations are made, the difference between the coefficients on PCI and CABG 
treatments is 13.5 percentage points and is significant at the        level.   
 
Table 2.4 – Regression Results for Discrete Time Linear Probability Hazard Model 
 
 
In columns 2-5 of Table 2.4, we add additional control variables that may be associated 
with both selection into treatment and the propensity to quit smoking.  In column 2, we add a 
control for a patient’s first AMI.  In column 3, we further control for the Elixhauser comorbidity 
                                                                                                                                                             
0.2250 + 0.57 * 0.0501 = 0.2536.  The difference between that increase and the increase for MM patients is 0.2035 
or 20.4 percentage points. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.046*** -0.050
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.032)
PCI * ∆After 0.090** 0.054 0.034 0.033 0.026
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042)
CABG * ∆After 0.225*** 0.195*** 0.160*** 0.155*** 0.141***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
∆Diagnosed 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.026)
∆AMI 0.083*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
CABG * ∆After - PCI * ∆After 0.135** 0.141** 0.126** 0.122** 0.115**
Elixhauser X X X
Demographics X X
Year, Period, Age, Yrs Smoked X
Observations 26,658 26,658 26,658 26,658 26,658
Individuals 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065
Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses.  Regressions are weighted by NHIS probability weights.  ∆AMI is 
an indicator for a patient having her first AMI (in our data) in a particular period.  Specifications 3 and 4 include 29 dummy variables 
indicating when the Elixhauser comorbidity conditions were first diagnosed (in our data).  In specification 4, demographic controls include 
gender, race, education dummies, and income category dummies (including a dummy for missing income data).  In specification 5, we also 
include year dummies, period dummies, age and age squared, and a variable indicating the number of years a person had been smoking as of 
the baseline period (9.5 years before treatment).   "CABG * ∆After - PCI * ∆After" is the difference between the PCI * ∆After and CABG 






conditions.  In column 4, we add controls for demographic characteristics.  And, in column 5, we 
add controls for the period, the calendar year, an individual’s age and age squared as of the 
treatment date, and the number of years she has smoked as of the baseline period (9.5 years prior 
to treatment).   An AMI proves to be a strong predictor of quitting smoking, increasing the 
predicted probability of quitting by between 7.5 and 8.3 percentage points, depending on the 
specification.  Moreover, once we add AMI, the estimated size of the PCI coefficient declines 
and is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.  In our final specification, we find 
that patients undergoing PCI are 2.6 percentage points more likely to quit smoking, though given 
the imprecision of our estimate, we cannot rule out the possibility of no association.
39
  While the 
coefficient on CABG also declines, it remains large and strongly statistically significant, both in 
comparison to medically managed patients and PCI patients.   In our fifth specification, 
undergoing CABG surgery in the same period in which CAD was diagnosed is associated with a 
roughly 14.1 percentage point increase in the probability of quitting smoking.  The increased quit 
rate associated with CABG is substantially larger than the increase associated with less invasive 
treatments for CAD, and approximately twice the increase associated with an AMI.  Moreover, 
in every specification, the difference between the CABG and PCI coefficients is consistently 
large – ranging from 0.115 to 0.141 – and significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
2.4.2 Multi-Period Quit Model Using Grouped Data 
 To illustrate that our results are not sensitive to a flexible specification of period effects 
and to account for clustering of disturbance terms by group and period at the individual level, we 
aggregate the data into 11 periods for each of the three groups of patients.  There are 33 cells in 
the aggregate sample, corresponding to the 33 data points shown in Figure 2.3.  We obtain two 
                                                 






quit series.  The first is unadjusted for covariates and is identical to the quit rates that appear in 
Figure 2.3.  The second quit series adjusts for effects due to diagnosis, AMI, and Elixhauser 
comorbidities.  It is obtained from the individual data by estimating a discrete time hazard 
function for the probability of quitting that includes 11 period dummies interacted with each of 
three treatment dummies (one for CABG, one for PCI, and one for MM), and the diagnosis, 
AMI, and Elixhauser variables defined in Equation 2.4.  The 33 coefficients associated with the 
period-treatment interactions are quit rates by group and period adjusted for the effects of the last 
three variables just mentioned.
40 
    
In the spirit of Donald and Lang (2007), we use this data to perform simple difference-in-
differences regressions with 11 observations.  To illustrate the model that we estimate, consider a 
log smoking participation function for two groups (g = c or p, c = CABG, p = PCI): 
 
   ln sgt =  + c + cat + 11 period dummies + gt.   (2.5) 
 
Here at, as defined in Equation 2.3, is an indicator that equals 1 in each of the two periods 
after treatment and gt is the error term.  Take the difference between each group in a given 
period to eliminate the intercept () and the period dummies.  Then take first differences to 
eliminate the group effect (): 
 
  ln sct – ln sct-1 – (ln spt – ln spt-1)  qct – qpt = (at – at-1) + error.   (2.6) 
 
 Equation 2.6 is a regression forced through the origin with 11 observations.  The 
                                                 
40 We do not adjust for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics since the inclusion of these characteristics 






dependent variable is the difference between the quit rate of CABG patients and the quit rate of 
PCI patients in each period.  The independent variable, (at – at-1),  equals 1 in the window 
spanning the period from 6 months before treatment to six months after treatment (period 10) 
and equals 0 in each of the other 10 periods or quit windows.   
 This approach has a number of attractive features.  First, aggregation accounts for 
clustering in the disturbance term in an individual-level log smoking participation or quit 
equation by group and period.  Second, if the error term in Equation 2.5 is a random walk, then 
serial correlation is eliminated once first differences are taken.  Third, the regression specified by 
Equation 2.6 implicitly controls for a full set of period effects.  Finally, by focusing on the 
difference in the quit rates in each period, we are asking whether this difference during the 
treatment period is sufficiently unusual compared to past and future values that it is unlikely to 
have arisen by chance.  If the quit rates in the two series normally track one another but do not 
during the treatment year, we would expect that there is something unusual about the treatment 
year.  On the other hand, if the quit rates in the two series often diverge wildly, then a substantial 
divergence in the treatment year might simply be due to chance. 
 Six aggregate quit regressions are contained in Table 2.5.  The three in the top row use 
the unadjusted quit series, while the three in the bottom row use the adjusted quit series.  In 
column 1, the dependent variable is the difference between the CABG and PCI quit rates; in 
column 2, it is the difference between the CABG and MM rates; and in column 3, it is the 
difference between the PCI and MM rates.  Three separate regressions are obtained for each 
series because of evidence that the residual variance is not the same for each dependent 
variable.
41
  To be consistent with the notation in Table 2.4, the variable at – at-1 is termed After 
                                                 
41 Consider the following two regressions 






in the table. 
 
Table 2.5 – Quit Rate Regression with Grouped Data 
 
 
Focusing on the first column of Table 2.5, one sees that the difference between the 
CABG quit rate and the PCI quit rate in treatment period is between 12 and 13 percentage points, 
regardless of whether one uses the raw data or adjusts the quit rate for covariates.  In the second 
column, we see that the difference in the quit rate between CABG and MM patients drops when 
one adjusts for covariates, but remains large (14.2 percentage points) and strongly statistically 
significant.  In the final column, we see that while the unadjusted quit rate for PCI patients is 7.3 
                                                                                                                                                             
   qct – qct-1 – (qmt   – qmt-1) = c(at – at-1), 
where m denotes medical management.  Estimates of p, c, and c - p could be obtained from a pooled regression 
of the form 
   qgt – qgt-1 – (qm   – qmt-1) = cc(at – at-1) + p(1 – c)(at – at-1). 
We do not follow that approach because the residual variance in the first regression is not equal to the corresponding 
variance in the second regression. 
(1) (2) (3)
CABG - PCI CABG - MM PCI - MM
∆After 0.127** 0.200*** 0.073
(no adjustments) (0.050) (0.044) (0.047)
∆After 0.120** 0.142*** 0.022
(with adjustments) (0.052) (0.042) (0.051)
N 11 11 11
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient on ∆After from a separate regression, with the standard 
error in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the quit rate for one group of patients minus the quit 
rate for another.  The independent variable is a dummy for the treatment year (∆After).   In the top 
row, the quit rate is unadjusted.  In the bottom row, the quit rate is adjusted for diagnosis, AMI, and 
Elixhauser comorbidities, based on an individual regression.  All quit rates are calculated using the 
NHIS probability weights.  Regressions are forced through the origin and weighted by the inverse of 
the square root of the variance of the difference between period-specific quit rates from individual 
level regressions with 33 group period interactions.   * significant at the  0.10 level;  ** significant at 






percentage points larger than for MM patients, once one adjusts for a patient’s CAD diagnosis 
and other medical conditions, the difference between the two quit rates is substantially smaller 
and not statistically distinguishable from zero.   
 
2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Selection Bias  
When interpreting our results, one important issue to address is the potential for selection 
bias.  CABG patients are clearly different from PCI patients on a number of observable 
characteristics, as shown in Table 2.1.  While we control for these variables in our regressions, 
are there unobservable characteristics that lead CABG patients to be more likely to quit smoking 
for reasons unrelated to their surgery?  In particular, are CAD patients – or their doctors – 
selecting CABG over PCI in instances where the patient is more likely to quit smoking?  
 Patient selection bias is unlikely to explain our results for several reasons.  First, as 
shown in Figure 2.2, the smoking participation rates for CABG and PCI patients are very similar 
in the period immediately prior to their procedure.  Since both groups having roughly 15% of 
their population still smoking six months prior to their procedure, there is nothing about the 
smoking participation rate that, in and of itself, implies a difference in the probability to quit. 
Second, as shown in Figure 2.3, the annual quit rates are very similar between CABG and PCI 
patients going back nine periods prior to their procedure.   White the quit rate for the CABG 
group rises between periods 7 and 9, it remains fairly close to the PCI quit rate and the difference 
is never statistically significant.
42
  Finally, CAD patients have limited authority to select their 
procedure, since the recommendation is made by their doctor.  While a patient can certainly 
                                                 
42 To test the statistical significance of the difference, we run a series of regressions like those in Table 4, that 
include the interaction of an indicator variable for Periods 7, 8, and 9 with an indicator for CABG and PCI.  The 






refuse any treatment she is referred to, this would most likely happen in the case where a patient 
was referred to CABG and refused due to the short-term health risks.  However, it seems likely 
that those patients who are concerned about the short-term health risks of CABG are also those 
who are most likely to quit smoking, a bias that would work against our main finding. 
  Doctor selection bias is also unlikely to explain our results.  First, doctors who refer 
patients to PCI or CABG generally do so on the basis of the severity of CAD, not based on a 
patient’s comorbidities or health behaviors.  When we enter separate CAD diagnosis effects for 
PCI and CABG patients into the regressions in Table 2.4 – to capture whether the severity of the 
diagnosis impacts smoking behavior – we do not find any significant difference.  Second, doctors 
who perform CABG (cardiothoracic surgeons) and PCI (interventional cardiologists) could 
selectively refuse those patients who they think are unlikely to quit smoking.  Putting aside the 
difficulty in accurately forecasting who will quit smoking, one would expect selective refusal to 
occur more frequently where there is excess demand.  Between 2001 and 2008, Epstein et al. 
(2011) estimate that the rate of PCI procedures in the U.S. held steady while the rate of CABG 
procedures decreased by 33%.  Given these trends, interventional cardiologists (who perform 
PCI) are more likely to face excess demand than cardiothoracic surgeons (who perform CABG) 
and therefore more likely to engage in patient selection on the basis of factors – like propensity 
to quit smoking – that would be likely to improve a patient’s outcome.  This bias, should it be 
present, would tend to work against our main finding. 
 
2.5.2 Alternative Mechanisms  
 In this paper, we demonstrate that CABG patients are substantially more likely to quit 






potential lifestyle modifications, this change in behavior may help explain why CABG patients 
experience better mortality and morbidity outcomes over the long term than otherwise similar 
PCI patients.   This finding is consistent with a model in which patients undergoing CABG 
receive a stronger and more persistent signal about the severity of their disease, leading them to 
improve their behavior.  However, other explanations are also possible. 
One alternative explanation is that CABG patients quit because they are forced to go 
“cold turkey” during the length of their hospital stay.  For the week that they are in a hospital, 
most CABG patients are presumably unable to smoke, potentially kick-starting the quitting 
process and making it easier for them to stay off cigarettes when discharged.  PCI patients, by 
contrast, typically spend a day or less in the hospital, which might account for their lower quit 
rate in the period surrounding their procedure. 
To test this theory – and provide a falsification test for our main results – we study two 
common procedures that are unrelated to smoking but require relatively long hospital stays: total 
knee replacement and total hip replacement.
43, 44
  These procedures – taken together – were 
performed over one million times in 2010, with over 500,000 procedures taking place in patients 
65 and older (CDC, 2010).  These two surgeries – which involve replacing a knee or hip joint 
with a metal or plastic replica – are generally done to relieve arthritic pain, and patients spend at 
least three to four nights in the hospital recovering.
45 
 Smoking is largely unrelated to knee or hip 
pain and so undergoing knee or hip replacement surgery would be unlikely to convey any new 
information to a smoker about the value of quitting.   
 
                                                 
43 We use ICD-9-CM procedure code 81.51 for Total Hip Replacement and 81.54 for Total Knee Replacement  
44 Thanks to Isaac Sorkin, who suggested we find non-smoking related procedures to do this type of analysis. 







Figure 2.4 – Quit Rate by Year Relative to Procedure (Knee/Hip vs. CABG) 
 
 
To test the impact of a long hospital stay on smoking, we identify total knee and total hip 
replacement patients using the same linked NHIS / Medicare data as in the main analysis. Figure 
2.4 reproduces the CABG quit rate from Figure 2.3 and adds a series showing the quit rate for 
patients who undergo knee or hip replacements.
46
  When we combine knee and hip replacement 
recipients, we have data on 155 patients who smoked nine and half years prior to their surgery, 
slightly below the 206 CABG smokers in our data.  In the years prior to their procedure, the quit 
rate for knee/hip and CABG patients are fairly similar, with the knee/hip quit rate somewhat 
                                                 
46 The small number of patients who have both knee and hip replacements are assigned a procedure date based on 












































higher five to nine years prior to surgery and the CABG quit rate somewhat higher one to three 
years prior to surgery.  However, while the quit rate for CABG patients jumps dramatically in the 
one year window surrounding their procedure, we see no similar increase for knee/hip patients.  
Consistent with the visual evidence shown in Figure 2.4, regression results (not shown) show no 
significant relationship between total knee or hip replacement surgery and quitting.  It appears 
unlikely that a substantial portion of the observed CABG impact on quitting is caused by going 
“cold turkey” during a patient’s hospital stay. 
 Alternatively, one might explain our main results by the doctor a patient sees.  As 
discussed above, CABG procedures are performed by cardiothoracic surgeons, while PCI 
procedures are performed by interventional cardiologists.  If these two types of doctors 
systematically give different advice to smokers on the importance of quitting, this might be the 
mechanism through which the CABG quit rate rises above the PCI quit rate near the treatment 
date.  Though different than our main hypothesis – that CABG sends a stronger and more 
persistent signal to the patient about his or her health problems – this mechanism is similar.  
Rather than the scar on a CABG patient’s chest, it may be her heart surgeon who convinces her 
to quit smoking.  Either way, the patient updates her opinion on the value of quitting smoking 
based on the CABG experience.  And, while this alternative explanation – that heart surgeons are 
more persuasive smoking cessation advocates – seems less likely to us, it arguably provides 
more actionable policy recommendations. 
 
2.5.3 Quitting and the PCI-CABG Mortality Differential 
 According to Figure 2.1, the cumulative mortality rate of PCI patients five years after 






versus 20 percent).  How much of this differential might be due to quitting behavior?  Let m be 
the mortality rate after five years, ms be the mortality rate of those who smoke one period after 
surgery, mq be the mortality rate of quitters, mn be the mortality rate of former smokers and 
nonsmokers, s be the fraction who smoke one period before surgery, and q be the fraction of 
smokers who quit.  As an identity 
   m  sms + sq(mq – ms) + (1 – s) mn.    (2.7) 
Assume that the only difference between the mortality rate of PCI patients (mp) and the 
mortality rate of CABG patients (mc) is due to differential quit behavior (qc > qp).  Then 
   mp – mc = s(qp – qc)(mq – ms).     (2.8) 
 In our data, approximately 15 percent of CABG and PCI patients smoke one period 
before surgery (s = 0.15).  Our estimates indicate that qp – qp = -0.12.  The medical literature 
suggests that CAD patients who quit smoking following surgery have a cumulative five-year 
mortality rate that is 20 percentage points smaller than patients who continue to smoke: mq – ms 
= -0.20 (Chen et al., 2012; Critchley and Capewell, 2003; de Boer et al., 2013; van Domburg et 
al., 2000).  Hence, mp – mc equals 0.36 percentage points.  Put differently, the higher quit rate of 
CABG patients compared to PCI patients accounts for roughly 6 percent of the 6.0 percentage 
point differential in mortality between the two groups of patients. 
 According to the computation just made, the higher quit rate of CABG patients makes a 
minor contribution to their improved survival prospects relative to PCI patients.  Several factors 
should be kept in mind in an evaluation of this result.  First, the component of the mortality 
differential due to quit behavior is small because the smoking participation rate is small and 
would be much larger in populations with higher rates.  For example, in one evaluation of the 






of males smoked before the intervention (Chen at al., 2012).  Second, quitting after surgery has 
bigger effects on survival than the use after surgery of statins, beta-blockers, or enzyme 
inhibitors (for example, Critchley and Capewell, 2003).  Finally, other lifestyle changes may 
accompany quitting smoking.       
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 Coronary Artery Disease is a frequently occurring and deadly disease.  There are several 
common treatments – including medical management, PCI, and CABG – and each has benefits 
and costs associated with it.  In this paper, we have examined one previously unexplored benefit 
of more invasive treatment: those who undergo a procedure, particularly the more invasive 
CABG surgery, are more likely to quit smoking.  In our preferred regression model, we estimate 
that CAD patients who undergo CABG are 12 percentage points more likely to quit smoking in 
the one-year window surrounding their surgery than patients who undergo PCI.  During the same 
one-year window, CABG patients are 14 percentage points more likely to quit smoking than 
medically managed patients.  These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. 
While we do not have data on behaviors other than smoking, we suspect that patients 
undergoing more invasive surgery are also more likely to improve their diet, limit excessive 
consumption of alcohol, and (when recommended) exercise more.  Taken together, these 
behavioral responses may offset the inherent risks of a more invasive surgery and help explain 
why the longer term outcomes for CABG patients exceed those of similar patients receiving PCI.  
Our findings also highlight the importance of emphasizing healthier behaviors to those patients 



































Obesity in the United States has been on the rise in recent decades, with the percentage of 
adults over 20 classified as obese (Body Mass Index – BMI – over 30) increasing from 22% in 
1988-1994 to 34% in 2007-2008.  Over the same period, the percentage of obese adolescents, 
age 12-19 years old, increased from 11% to 18%.  Obesity has been linked to a greater risk of 
health problems, including increased rates of heart disease and type 2 diabetes (Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention: CDC, 2010).  The CDC has written that “changes in children’s 
physical activity and eating habits over time appear to contribute to increases in prevalence of 
obesity” (CDC, 2010).  Since children and adolescents spend six to nine hours a day in and 
around their school, one might expect that their school environment has an impact on their 
exercise patterns and caloric intake.   
Recent research has found that the characteristics of a child’s school affect her weight 
and probability of being obese.  Using a large dataset from California, Currie et al. (2010) find 
that if a fast food restaurant is located within 0.1 miles of a high school, the proportion of 9
th
 
graders who are obese increases by 5.2 percent.  Anderson and Butcher (2006) find that a 10 
percentage point increase in the probability that a student is exposed to junk food in her school 
increases her BMI by one point, on average.  Schanzenbach (2009) finds that students who 
consume school lunches – rather than bringing their own lunch from home – weigh more and are 
more likely to be obese.  Drake et. al. (2012) estimate that obesity rates would decline by 26% if 
adolescents played on at least two sports teams per year.  In each case, the specific characteristics 
of a school – its location, junk food policies, school lunch quality, and athletic opportunities – 
appear to affect student weight, BMI, and/or obesity (Anderson et al., 2011).   
                                                 
47 I would like to thank Michael Grossman, David Jaeger, Ted Joyce, Wim Vijverberg, Steve O’Connell, Shannon 
O’Grady and participants at the 2015 American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting for helpful 







Figure 3.1 – Distribution of PSAL Sports teams by school and incoming obesity rates by 




Note: this chart only includes schools and programs that had lotteries included in this study.  PSAL sports team data are 
from the 2014/15 high school directory.  Incoming obesity rates are from 2011 NYC FITNESSGRAM. 
 
Based, in part, on the belief that schools influence obesity, the New York City 
Department of Education (NYCDOE) has developed and expanded system-wide programs to 
help children develop healthier lifestyles.  The city has introduced healthier school lunches, 
promoted physical activity, and provided fitness reports to all students and parents using the 
NYC FITNESSGRAM program.  There are also a number of school-level channels in New York 
through which attending one school or another might affect a student’s weight. Certain schools 
are located in close proximity to fast food restaurants, while others are more distant.  The 
availability of sports programs varies widely by school, as shown on the left side of Figure 3.1. 
Also in Figure 3.1, we can see that the body composition of each school’s incoming 9
th
 grade 
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Fowler, 2007, Trogdon, Nonnemaker and Pais, 2008, and Fowler and Christakis, 2008).
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The goal of this research is to begin to answer the question: do schools affect obesity 
within New York City?  In particular, I ask whether attending one New York City high school 
versus another has a differential effect on a student’s weight, BMI, and probability of becoming 
overweight or obese.  To answer this question, I use a natural experiment provided by the 
admissions process to New York City high schools.  For a subset of high schools that admit 
students by lottery, I use a t-test to estimate whether there is a statistically significant impact of 
attending that high school on a student’s weight, BMI, overweight-ness, and obesity.  I find that 
one observes statistically significant effects at the 0.05 level roughly as often as one would 
expect if schools had no differential effect on obesity-related variables (i.e. about 5% of the 
time).  This finding is consistent with the proposition that the specific school a student attends 
does not have a substantial effect on his or her weight gain.  For comparison, I perform a similar 
analysis for student achievement variables – including credits earned, test scores, attendance, and 
on-time graduation – where a priori one would expect a differentiated school effect.  For 
achievement variables – particularly credits earned in 9
th
 grade – I find a statistically significant 
effect more often than one would expect by chance.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
In this study, I take advantage of the lottery component of the high school admissions 
                                                 
48 See Cohen-Cole and Fletcher (2008) for an argument against peer effects on student weight. 
49 For example, the New York Times profiled the non-profit FoodFight, which has been hired by several New York 
City schools, saying that their curriculum “blends media literacy, politics, nutrition and cooking” to encourage more 
thoughtful, healthy eating (October 26, 2011).  Another non-profit, New York Road Runners, works with 450 New 






process in New York City.  Each year, approximately 80,000 eighth graders rank up to 12 high 
school programs in priority order.  Using a computer algorithm based on the national medical 
residency match, the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) then assigns each 
applicant to a high school (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth, 2004).  When certain programs are 
oversubscribed – a list that includes a large number of new small schools started since 2003 – 
admission is based partly on a random number assigned to each student.   
For those schools that admit students by lottery and are oversubscribed, I use the 
admissions process as a natural experiment. For each school, I divide students who chose the 
school first into three groups: 1) students who were subject to the lottery and were admitted, 2) 
students who were subject to the lottery and were not admitted, and 3) students who were not 
subject to the lottery (whether or not they were admitted).  For each school, the first group forms 
the “treatment” group and the second group forms the “control” group.  Students in the third 
group are not part of this study, since their admission was not based on a random number. This 
process is described in detail in Section 3.4. 
I then compare the outcomes of those two groups on five health related measures: student 
height, weight, BMI, an indicator for being overweight, and an indicator for obesity.  I also 
compare each group along a series of academic outcomes in high school, including attendance, 
credits earned, English test scores, and graduation rates.  For each school in each year where 
students were admitted through an oversubscribed lottery, I perform a t-test on the null 
hypothesis of equal means, assuming equal variances (Kenkel, 1981: 412).  The test statistic is: 
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In Equation 1.1,  ̅  is the average outcome of interest (weight, height, BMI, or an 
overweight or obesity indicator) for the treatment group and  ̅  is the same outcome for the 
control group.     
  is the variance of the outcome for the treatment group and    is the sample 
size, while   
 
 
 and    are the variance and sample size for the control group, respectively. I then 




For this study, I was provided with de-identified student-level administrative data by the 
New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE).  The data contain scrambled student ID 
numbers so that the data can be linked across years and across datasets.   
To create the treatment and control groups, I use data from the high school admissions 
process for the years 2005 to 2009.
50
  These data contain one record for every 8
th
 grade applicant 
in the high school admissions process for each year. Each record has information on up to 12 
choices made by the student in order of preference.  For each choice, the data show the student’s 
eligibility, geographic priority, and the rank the school gave the student, where applicable.  The 
file also shows the program the student was eventually matched to. 
 To calculate the outcome variables, I begin with student height and weight collected as 
part of the New York City FITNESSGRAM program.  Through the program, which began in 
2006, all students in Kindergarten through 12
th
 grade in New York City are supposed to have 
their height, weight, strength, endurance, and flexibility measured every year.  Since it was first 
                                                 







introduced, participation has increased substantially, reaching over 80% in the 2009/10 and 
2010/11 school years (see Table 3.1).  I then calculate the Body Mass Index (BMI) for each 
student, defined as weight (in kilograms) divided by height squared (in meters).  Using the BMI-
for-Age growth charts provided by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
51
, I flag 
each student as being overweight if she is in or above the 85
th
 percentile and obese if she is in or 
above the 95
th
 percentile.  For a student who is over 19 years old, I categorize her as overweight 
if her BMI is greater than or equal to 25 and obese if her BMI is greater than or equal to 30. 
 
Table 3.1 – FITNESSGRAM Participation by Year 
 
 
3.4 Confirming Randomization in School Lotteries 
 In New York City, students don’t technically apply to high schools, but rather to high 
school programs.  Some high schools have more than one program, each of which may have a 
different academic focus and selection criteria.  The new small high schools started since 2003 – 
the focus of this study – generally consist of a single program with an admissions criteria known 
as “limited unscreened.”  For this group of schools, studying the impact of a program is identical 
to studying the impact of a school. 
If a limited unscreened program is oversubscribed, student admission is determined first 
                                                 
51 Source: http://www.cdc.gov/growthcharts/html_charts/bmiagerev.htm (accessed 7/12/2012) 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
FITNESSGRAM Tests 453,635 632,168 743,307 830,572 811,764
K-12 Enrollment 994,292 981,862 975,421 983,664 986,821
Participation Rate 46% 64% 76% 84% 82%
Source: FITNESSGRAM tests based on the number of observations with a non-null value for the







by a student’s priority group and second by a random number assigned to each student.  A 
student’s priority group is defined along two dimensions: geography and school rank.  Certain 
programs give geographic priority to students who live in the school’s local district or borough.  
Moreover, schools with limited unscreened programs are allowed to rank their applicants with a 
1 if they attended an information session or visited the school (known as making an “informed 
choice” to apply) and with a 2 otherwise.  All else equal, students with higher geographic priority 
are admitted first over students with lower geographic priority and students with a rank of 1 are 
admitted before students with a rank of 2.  In the 2005 admissions process, geographic priority 
was considered before school rank (i.e. a student with geographic priority 1 and rank 2 was 
admitted before a student with geographic priority 2 and rank 1).  In the 2006 through 2009 
admissions processes, school rank was considered before geographic priority.
52
   
For limited unscreened programs that are under-subscribed – with fewer applicants than 
available seats – there is no lottery.  All students are admitted to the program if they do not get 
into one of their higher ranked programs.  For over-subscribed programs, the lottery occurs in a 
single priority group.  All students in a higher priority group than the lottery group are admitted 
(if they do not match to a higher ranked program) and all students in a lower priority group are 
not admitted.  For simplicity, in this study I focus only on students who selected a program as 
their first choice.  Each student, therefore, can enter at most one lottery. 
Table 3.2 shows the number of limited unscreened programs each year that were 
sufficiently over-subscribed to require that a lottery be held among their first-choice applicants.  
From 2005 to 2007, there were between 63 and 76 programs with first-choice lotteries, a number 
                                                 
52 In 2008, the NYCDOE added a third determinant of a student’s priority: where the student ranked the school on 
her list of 12 choices.  Therefore, beginning in 2008, a student’s priority was determined by 1) the rank the school 
gave her, 2) where she lived, and then 3) where she ranked the school.  Lotteries were only performed among groups 
that tied on all three priority levels.  For this study, the practical impact is to limit the number of lotteries that occur 






that dropped to 30 in 2008 and 35 in 2009.  Over the five years, there were 277 different lotteries 
– representing 116 unique programs – where admission to a program was determined partially by 
a random number. 
 
Table 3.2 – Number of Programs with First-Choice Lotteries by Year 
 
  
To confirm randomization in each of these lotteries, I test their balance across a series of 
pre-high school covariates.  In Table 3.3, I show the balance for a sample school: High School A.  
Table 3.3 examines eleven different pre-intervention characteristics, all measured when a student 
was in 8
th
 grade.  The first three variables related to student academic outcomes, including 
reading test scores, math test scores, and attendance.  The next three variables reflect student 
demographics, including the percentage of students who are female, the percentage of students 
who qualify for free or reduced price lunch, and the percentage of students who are black.  The 
final five variables correspond to data collected through the NYC FITNESSGRAM program, 
including student weight, height, BMI, and the percentage of students who overweight and 
obese.  Because the NYC FITNESSGRAM program did not exist prior to the 2006/07 school 
year, no 8
th





Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Lottery 63 73 76 30 35 277
No Lottery 48 58 72 138 145 461
Total 111 131 148 168 180 738
Note: This table shows the total number of limited unscreened programs, broken
into those that were oversubscribed and held lotteries among their first choice
applicants and those that were not.  2005 refers to the admissions process for 











In Table 3.3, “T” represents the treatment group outcome.  In the top left corner of the 
table, we see that in 2005, students who chose High School A first and were admitted by lottery 
(the treatment group) had an average 8
th
 grade reading test score that was 0.16 standard 
deviations below the mean for New York City.  “C” represents the control group.  In the second 
column, we see that students who chose High School A first and were not admitted by lottery 
(the control group) had an average 8
th
 grade reading test score that was 0.23 standard deviations 
below the mean for New York City.  In the third column, we see that a two-sample t-test for 
equality of means has a p-value of 0.59, implying that it is not unlikely we would see this type of 
treatment-control difference by chance.  Looking across all five years, only one of the 45 
differences is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, a number consistent with (if slightly 
below) what one would expect by chance.   
  
  
T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P
Avg. reading test score in 8th gr. (z) -0.16 -0.23 0.59 -0.28 -0.29 0.91 -0.27 -0.16 0.53 -0.28 0.07 0.15 -0.31 -0.15 0.34
Avg. math test score in 8th gr. (z) -0.32 -0.36 0.82 -0.44 -0.42 0.95 -0.55 -0.47 0.58 -0.37 -0.24 0.60 -0.32 -0.37 0.79
Avg. attendance rate in 8th gr. 86.3 86.4 0.97 85.4 84.0 0.70 82.1 87.3 0.11 87.8 83.5 0.23 88.9 87.9 0.70
Percent female 84.4 92.9 0.15 81.8 77.0 0.63 89.7 77.6 0.17 76.6 94.1 0.11 71.9 83.3 0.33
Percent free/reduced price lunch 66.7 67.1 0.96 72.7 67.8 0.66 79.3 70.7 0.40 79.7 76.5 0.78 76.6 66.7 0.40
Percent black 44.4 48.6 0.67 31.8 49.4 0.14 37.9 41.4 0.76 34.4 35.3 0.94 42.2 33.3 0.50
Weight in 8th grade (pounds) . . . . . . 154 150 0.85 140 118 0.12 137 137 0.99
Height in 8th grade (inches) . . . . . . 62.9 63.2 0.79 63.6 62.2 0.24 64.1 62.9 0.33
BMI in 8th grade . . . . . . 27.1 26.3 0.79 24.4 21.4 0.23 23.3 24.5 0.51
Percent overweight in 8th grade . . . . . . 62.5 64.7 0.92 51.5 20.0 0.20 48.8 66.7 0.34
Percent obese in 8th grade . . . . . . 50.0 47.1 0.90 30.3 20.0 0.65 14.6 44.4 0.04
Number of students 52 86 25 100 35 67 79 19 75 21
Note: T = Treatment Group, C = Control Group, P = P-Value of a t-test of the equality of the treatment and control means.   Variables with (z) in the title
are normalized z-scores, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one for the entire population of test-takers within a given year.
The "number of students" represents the total number of students in the lottery, though certain students are missing data for certain variables.
2005 refers to the admissions process for entry into high school in September 2005










 This analysis can be expanded to all lotteries that took place between 2005 and 2009 in 
all programs.  Figure 3.2 is a bar chart showing the results for average weight in 8
th
 grade.  The 
horizontal axis has one (narrow) bar for each of the 94 lotteries where both the treatment and 
control group had at least two observations with 8
th
 grade weight recorded.
53
  The vertical axis 
shows the p-value for a t-test of equality of means.  Of the 94 t-tests, six have a p-value less than 
or equal to 0.05, corresponding to 6.4% of the total.  This is consistent with what we would 
expect by chance, and provides evidence that the treatment and control groups were properly 





                                                 
53 One needs at least two observations to calculate the t-statistic in Equation 1, since both the treatment and control 
group must have some variation.  Of the 277 total lotteries, 159 are missing 8
th
 grade weight for the treatment and/or 
control groups, since many lotteries took place prior to regular administration of the FITNESSGRAM test.  The 

























Table 3.4 – Fraction of Lotteries with Covariate P-Values Less than or Equal to 0.05.   
 
 
Table 3.4 shows the results for all eleven covariates.  For each covariate, close to 5% of 
the t-tests have p-values less than or equal to 0.05, ranging from 2.4% for “percent obese” to 
7.4% for “percent black.”  Of the 1,835 t-tests run across all lotteries and all nine covariates, 
5.3% have p-values less or equal to than 0.05.  This balance provides evidence that the lotteries 




 In Table 3.5, I show 25 outcome variables for High School A, the same school used as 
an example in Table 3.3.  The first 20 outcome variables are based on the FITNESSGRAM data, 
including height, weight, BMI, percent overweight, and percent obese.  For each category, I 
record results in the first through fourth year of high school. The last five variables are student 
Lotteries with 
P ≤ 0.05 All Lotteries
Fraction with P 
≤ 0.05
Avg. reading test score in 8th grade (z) 8 232 0.034
Avg. math test score in 8th grade (z) 16 234 0.068
Avg. attendance rate in 8th grade 12 235 0.051
Percent female 12 220 0.055
Percent free/reduced price lunch 8 229 0.035
Percent black 17 229 0.074
Weight in 8th grade (pounds) 6 94 0.064
Height in 8th grade (inches) 6 93 0.065
BMI in 8th grade 5 92 0.054
Percent overweight in 8th grade 6 92 0.065
Percent obese in 8th grade 2 85 0.024
Total 98 1,835 0.053
Note: P = P-Value of a t-test of the equality of the treatment and control means.  Variables with (z) in
the title are normalized z-scores, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one for the entire






achievement variables, including the average attendance rate and credits earned during the first 
year of high school, the average English Regents test score during the third year of high school, 
and the percentage of students who had graduated by the fourth year of high school (with one 
graduation rate restricted to the more rigorous Regents diploma). 
 
Table 3.5 – Outcomes for High School A 
 
  
In Table 3.5, we can see that High School A did not begin administering the 
FITNESSGRAM test until the 2008/09 school year.  Students only have first-year height and 
weight results for the admissions processes in 2008 and 2009.  Students who were admitted to 9
th
 
grade in 2005 have only a fourth-year result, since the 2008/09 school year corresponds to their 
T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P
Height (Year 1 of HS) . . . . . . . . . 63.9 62.7 0.39 64.6 63.0 0.18
Height (Year 2 of HS) . . . . . . 62.7 64.2 0.13 64.0 63.3 0.41 65.9 64.1 0.09
Height (Year 3 of HS) . . . 64.0 64.7 0.68 63.1 64.8 0.13 64.8 63.8 0.33 . . .
Height (Year 4 of HS) 64.8 65.1 0.74 64.0 64.8 0.57 . . . . . . . . .
Weight (Year 1 of HS) . . . . . . . . . 140.3 145.3 0.69 150.7 145.4 0.66
Weight (Year 2 of HS) . . . . . . 143.4 150.2 0.67 143.7 132.9 0.27 152.9 168.3 0.29
Weight (Year 3 of HS) . . . 140.9 139.5 0.90 140.9 143.2 0.85 150.6 137.0 0.18 . . .
Weight (Year 4 of HS) 150.0 164.3 0.38 148.0 152.9 0.68 . . . . . . . . .
BMI (Year 1 of HS) . . . . . . . . . 24.2 26.2 0.36 25.3 26.0 0.65
BMI (Year 2 of HS) . . . . . . 25.7 25.8 0.96 24.7 23.4 0.41 24.6 28.6 0.05
BMI (Year 3 of HS) . . . 24.2 23.9 0.90 24.8 24.0 0.67 25.2 23.7 0.36 . . .
BMI (Year 4 of HS) 25.1 25.3 0.92 25.5 25.6 0.96 . . . . . . . . .
% Overweight (Year 1 of HS) . . . . . . . . . 52.4 50.0 0.92 54.5 54.5 1.00
% Overweight (Year 2 of HS) . . . . . . 27.8 31.6 0.81 48.9 27.3 0.20 41.2 58.3 0.29
% Overweight (Year 3 of HS) . . . 25.0 30.0 0.80 33.3 35.7 0.88 40.5 38.5 0.90 . . .
% Overweight (Year 4 of HS) 30.4 38.5 0.64 66.7 46.9 0.31 . . . . . . . . .
% Obese (Year 1 of HS) . . . . . . . . . 19.0 33.3 0.43 30.9 45.5 0.36
% Obese (Year 2 of HS) . . . . . . 27.8 21.1 0.64 19.1 27.3 0.56 19.6 50.0 0.03
% Obese (Year 3 of HS) . . . 12.5 15.0 0.87 26.7 14.3 0.33 26.2 23.1 0.83 . . .
% Obese (Year 4 of HS) 13.0 30.8 0.21 11.1 15.6 0.74 . . . . . . . . .
Attendance Rate (Year 1 of HS) 73.9 79.5 0.16 76.2 79.3 0.57 77.2 86.3 0.06 83.4 83.7 0.95 0.9 0.8 0.36
Credits Earned (Year 1 of HS) 10.0 8.7 0.18 9.9 9.3 0.59 8.9 10.6 0.18 10.3 10.8 0.71 12.3 10.7 0.24
Eng. Regents Score (Year 3 of HS) 70.5 65.2 0.21 72.8 63.1 0.04 75.0 73.1 0.54 78.8 75.3 0.26 . . .
Graduation Rate (Year 4 of HS) 59.0 50.0 0.41 62.5 57.4 0.72 . . . . . . . . .
Regents Grad. Rate (Year 4 of HS) 38.5 37.5 0.93 50.0 31.1 0.16 . . . . . . . . .
Number of students 52 86 25 100 35 67 79 19 75 21
Note: T = Treatment Group, C = Control Group, P = P-Value of a t-test of the equality of the treatment and control means.   Variables with (z) in the title
are normalized z-scores, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one for the entire population of test-takers within a given year.
The "number of students" represents the total number of students in the lottery, though certain students are missing data for certain variables.
2005 refers to the admissions process for entry into high school in September 2005






fourth year of high school.   
Looking across all FITNESSGRAM and student achievement variables, we see only 
three p-values that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The students admitted by lottery 
to High School A in 2006 had an average English Regents score three years later of 72.8, 
compared to 63.1 for those students turned away by the lottery, a difference with a p-value of 
0.04.  The lottery winners in 2009 had a second-year BMI and percentage obese that was 
sufficiently different from the lottery losers that the p-values were 0.05 and 0.03, respectively.  
Aside from these three results, no other p-values on the table are equal to or below 0.05.  Seeing 
three of 58 p-values equal to or below 0.05 is roughly what one would expect by chance if High 
School A had no differential effect on FITNESSGRAM or student achievement outcomes. 
As with the tests for covariate balance in the prior section, we can repeat the analysis for 
all programs that had at least one lottery between 2005 and 2009.  The results for one variable – 
average weight three years after a student starts high school – are shown in Figure 3.3.  As 
before, the height of each bar represents the p-value for a t-test of equality of means for one of 
the 123 lotteries held between 2005 and 2009.  Six of these lotteries, representing 4.9% of the 
total, had p-values equal to or lower than 0.05.  These results are consistent with what one would 
expect to see if the null hypothesis were true, and schools have no differential effect on student 








Figure 3.3 – P-Values for Average Weight Three Years After Starting High School 
 
Table 3.6 shows the results for all lotteries across each of the 25 different outcome 
variables.  Overall, we see little evidence of differential school effects on variables related to 
student weight.  Looking at BMI, 4.1% of lotteries have p-values at or below 0.05, close to what 
one would expect by chance.  The results for weight, percentage overweight, and percentage 
obese are similar.  Looking at student height, where I would a priori expect schools to have little 
impact, we see this to be the case.  Out of 370 lotteries, 6.8% have p-values less than or equal to 
0.05. 

























Table 3.6 – Fraction of Lotteries with Outcome P-Values Less than or Equal to 0.05  
 
Lotteries with 
P ≤ 0.05 All Lotteries
Fraction with P 
≤ 0.05
Height
Height (Year 1 of HS) 5 62 0.081
Height (Year 2 of HS) 5 104 0.048
Height (Year 3 of HS) 7 123 0.057
Height (Year 4 of HS) 8 81 0.099
Total 25 370 0.068
Weight
Weight (Year 1 of HS) 0 61 0.000
Weight (Year 2 of HS) 3 104 0.029
Weight (Year 3 of HS) 6 123 0.049
Weight (Year 4 of HS) 1 80 0.013
Total 10 368 0.027
Body Mass Index
BMI (Year 1 of HS) 1 61 0.016
BMI (Year 2 of HS) 6 103 0.058
BMI (Year 3 of HS) 6 123 0.049
BMI (Year 4 of HS) 2 79 0.025
Total 15 366 0.041
% Overweight
% Overweight (Year 1 of HS) 2 59 0.034
% Overweight (Year 2 of HS) 6 102 0.059
% Overweight (Year 3 of HS) 7 119 0.059
% Overweight (Year 4 of HS) 2 77 0.026
Total 17 357 0.048
% Obese
% Obese (Year 1 of HS) 2 53 0.038
% Obese (Year 2 of HS) 5 98 0.051
% Obese (Year 3 of HS) 4 110 0.036
% Obese (Year 4 of HS) 0 68 0.000
Total 11 329 0.033
Student Achievement Measures
Attendance Rate (Year 1 of HS) 18 227 0.079
Credits Earned (Year 1 of HS) 34 226 0.150
English Regents Score (Year 3 of HS) 17 180 0.094
Graduation Rate (Year 4 of HS) 9 111 0.081
Regents Graduation Rate (Year 4 of HS) 8 107 0.075
Total 86 851 0.101
Note: P = P-Value of a t-test of the equality of the treatment and control means.  Each program-year






 The results are somewhat different for academic outcomes.  This can be seen most 
clearly in Figure 3.4, which is a graphical representation of the last column of Table 3.6.  The 
figure is sorted in ascending order, based on the percentage of p-values that are equal to or less 
than 0.05.  The darker bars correspond to the FITNESSGRAM measures, which generally had 
about 5% of p-values at or below the 0.05 level.  Those that are the farthest from 5% -- either 
above or below – correspond to FITNESSGRAM measures from Year 1 or Year 4 of high school 
– where the sample size of lotteries is lowest (see Table 3.6).   
 
Figure 3.4 - Fraction of Lotteries with Outcome P-Values Less than or equal to 0.05 
 
The lighter bars correspond to student achievement outcomes.  For all five outcomes 
shown here, the treatment group and control group were statistically different from one another 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































year of high school, where 34 of the 226 lotteries had p-values at or below 0.05, corresponding to 
15% of the total.  Given that schools might be expected to influence student credits through two 
channels – both the quality of instruction and the ease with which they award credits – it is 
perhaps not surprising that differential school effects show up most frequently on this measure.   
 
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
 In this study, I assess the impact of attending one New York City high school versus 
another on student weight and weight-related outcomes.  For a group of New York City high 
schools that admit students by lottery, I compare the weight-related outcomes for two groups of 
students who chose the school first.  The first group – the treatment group – are those who chose 
the school first and were admitted based purely on a random number.  The second group – the 
control group – are those who chose the school first and were not admitted based purely on a 
random number.  Overall, by tabulating the results for hundreds of small lotteries, I find little 
evidence that schools have a differential impact on student weight or weight-related variables. 
 There are several limitations to this study.  First, I can make no claim about the overall 
effect of going to high school in New York City on student weight loss or gain.  There may be 
system-wide programs in New York City that have a substantial effect on student obesity rates, 
and this study is not designed to capture their effectiveness.  Rather, I look specifically at 
whether there is a differential effect of being admitted to a particular school as one’s first choice, 
rather than being admitted to one of the various schools chosen lower on the application (or, in 
some cases, a school that a student did not choose).   
Second, my counterfactual for each school is somewhat different, reflecting the 






first and lower choices, the schools attended by the control group may be similar to the schools 
attended by the treatment group. Therefore, it is possible that differential school effects exist, but 
only when comparing schools that are less alike than those a student lists on her application. 
Third, in contrast to some research cited above, all of the schools in this study are part of 
a single school district.  It may be that some of the school effects found in prior research are 
actually district effects.  The quality of a school’s lunches or a school’s propensity to install 
snack and soda machines may vary more by district than by school, limiting my ability to capture 
their impact in this study.  At the same time, individual schools in New York do undertake 
obesity reduction programs, and other factors – such as the number of sports teams offered or the 
body composition of the incoming class – do vary by school. 
Fourth, most of my lotteries are small, sometimes very small.  High School A, shown as 
an example in Tables 3.2 and 3.4, has at least 19 students in both the treatment and control group 
for all five years of the study.  However, it is the exception, rather than the rule.  Of the 277 
lotteries shown in Table 3.2, only 41 had 19 or more students in both the treatment and control 
group (five of which were for High School A).   Any individual lottery, therefore, would be 
unlikely to have a p-value less than 0.05 unless the school effect was particularly large.  By 
combining lotteries as I do in Table 3.6, I begin to address this concern.
54
  Even with a small 
school effect, one would expect to see more than 5% of lotteries have a p-value below 0.05.  
However, with small lotteries, it might not be much greater than 5%. 
                                                 
54 This study combines lotteries by reviewing each one individually and assessing the proportion that have p-values 
less than 0.05.  Another possibility would be to pool all lotteries into a single large lottery.  I believe this is not 
appropriate for the current question, because I have no reason to expect that the treatment schools have 
systematically higher (or lower) weight outcomes than the control schools.  Rather, I am testing whether they have 
systematically different weight outcomes.  If certain treatment schools have lower weight outcomes than their 
control schools (perhaps because of an effective exercise program), and certain treatment schools have higher 
weight outcomes than their control schools (perhaps because they are located next to a fast food restaurant), these 
effects might cancel out in a pooled sample.  However, using my methodology, I should capture both of these 






Given the small size of the lotteries – which make detecting any effect difficult – the 
student achievement results are all the more remarkable.  Fifteen percent of the lotteries show a 
statistically significant effect at the 0.05 level on 9
th
 grade credits earned, despite the fact that the 
vast majority of lotteries have fewer than 20 students in either the treatment or control group.  
The other achievement results show a similar – though less dramatic – pattern, with more than 
5% of p-values below 0.05.  In future work, I plan to expand on these findings, looking at 
whether the academic results are consistent in one direction over time – i.e. schools have 
consistently positive or negative effects – and assessing how they align with common non-
experimental methods of evaluating schools.  For the present study, however, the student 
achievement results make a clear point: even with small lotteries, differential school effects are 









Table A.1.1 – Subjective Division of Teacher Survey Questions 
Intrinsic Motivation Questions (Subjective Division) 
  Number Statement 
t_q2b Teachers in this school set high standards for student work in their classes 
t_q5a To what extent do you feel supported by: your principal 
t_q5c To what extent do you feel supported by: other teachers at your school 
t_q6b 
School leaders invite teachers to play a meaningful role in setting goals and 
making important decisions for this school 
t_q6d 
Teachers in my school respect teachers who take the lead in school 
improvement efforts 
t_q6e Teachers in my school trust each other 
t_q6f 
Teachers in my school recognize and respect colleagues who are the most 
effective teachers 
t_q6h School leaders give me regular and helpful feedback about my teaching 
t_q6i School leaders place a high priority on the quality of teaching at this school 
  
Other Questions (Subjective Division) 
  
Number Statement 
t_q1a School leaders communicate a clear vision for this school 
t_q1c School leaders encourage open communication on important school issues 
t_q1d 
Curriculum, instruction, and assessment are aligned within and across the 
grade levels at this school 
t_q1e The principal places the learning needs of children ahead of other interests 
t_q1f The principal is an effective manager who makes the school run smoothly 
t_q1g I trust the principal at his or her word 
t_q2c 
My school has clear measures of progress for student achievement 
throughout the year 
t_q2d 
This school makes it a priority to help students develop challenging learning 
goals 
t_q2e 
This school makes it a priority to help students find the best ways to achieve 
their learning goals 
t_q4 
My school offers a wide enough variety of courses to keep students at my 
school engaged 
t_q6a The principal has confidence in the expertise of the teachers 
t_q6c School leaders provide time for collaboration among teachers 
t_q6g 








Most teachers in my school work together on teams to improve their 
instructional practice 
t_q6l 
Teachers in my school use student achievement data to improve instructional 
decisions 
t_q7a 
The professional development I received this year provided me with 
teaching strategies to better meet the needs of my students 
t_q7b 
I have sufficient materials to teach my class(es), including: books, 
audio/visual equipment, maps, and/or calculators 
t_q7d 
This year, I received helpful training on the use of student achievement data 
to improve teaching and learning 
t_q7e 
The professional development I received this year provided me with content 
support in my subject area 
t_q8a 
Obtaining information from parents about student learning needs is a priority 
at my school 
t_q8b 
Teachers and administrators in my school use information from parents to 
improve instructional practices and meet student learning needs 
t_q8c My school communicates effectively with parents when students misbehave 
t_q10d 
How often during this school year have you: sent parents written 
information on what you are teaching and what students are expected to 
learn 
t_q10e 
How often during this school year have you: sent home information on 
services to help students or parents such as: tutoring, after-school programs, 
or workshops adults can attend to help their children in school 
t_q11a Order and discipline are maintained at my school 
t_q11b 
I can get the help I need at my school to address student behavior and 
discipline problems 
t_q11c I am safe at my school 
t_q11d Crime and violence are a problem in my school 
t_q11e Students in my school are often threatened or bullied 
t_q11g Most students at my school treat teachers with respect 
t_q11h Most parents treat teachers at this school with respect 
t_q11j Students' use of alcohol and illegal drugs in school is a problem at my school 
t_q11k 
There are conflicts at my school based on race, color, creed, ethnicity, 
national origin, citizenship/immigration status, religion, gender, gender 
identity, gender expression, sexual orientation or disability 
t_q11l 
There is a person or a program in my school that helps students resolve 
conflicts 
t_q11m Gang activity is a problem in my school 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D i  Coefficient 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Intrinsic Motivation Questions N/A 0.07 0.17* 0.05 -0.15 -0.14
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Other Questions N/A 0.08 0.15 0.03 -0.14 -0.12
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Difference (Intrinsic - Other) N/A -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.00 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
N N/A 299 299 299 299 294
Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression of the mean school-level teacher survey 
scores as the dependent variable and treatment (D i) as the independent variable.  Regressions are 
weighted by the number of responders at each school.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 






Table A.1.3 - Intrinsic Motivation Questions vs. Other Questions (Factor Analysis Division, 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D i  Coefficient 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Intrinsic Motivation Questions N/A 0.11 0.21* 0.07 -0.16 -0.17
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
School Safety Questions N/A 0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Difference (Intrinsic - Safety) N/A 0.14 0.17* 0.18* -0.00 -0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
N N/A 299 299 299 299 294
Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression of the mean school-level teacher survey 
scores as the dependent variable and treatment (D i) as the independent variable.  Regressions are 
weighted by the number of responders at each school.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D i  Coefficient 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Subjective Division N/A -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.00 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Factor Analysis Division N/A 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.02
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
N N/A 302 302 302 302 297
Program Post-Program
Note: each coefficient is the result of a separate regression.  The dependent variable is a difference-
in-difference variable based on school-level survey scores.  The first difference is between survey 
scores related to intrinsic motivation and those unrelated.  The second difference is between the year 
shown and 2007.  The independent variable is a dummy (Di) indicating whether or not the school was 
randomly offered treatment.  Regressions are weighted by the number of responders at each school.  










E s (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coefficient 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 N = 
Math, Treatment 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.19** 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.07 793
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
ELA, Treatment 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.04 793
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Math, Control 0.13* 0.14 0.15* 0.25*** 0.25** 0.31*** 0.27** 0.21** 745
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
ELA, Control 0.13* 0.08 0.15** 0.15** 0.17** 0.20** 0.15** 0.12 745
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Pre-Program Program Post-Program
Note: Each number is the coefficient on Es in a separate local linear regression of school-level mean 
test score on distance from the eligiblity cut point and an indicator for bonus eligiblity (Es).  The 
regressions are fit separately on either side of the cut point, and are weighted by the number of test 
takers in each school.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample size is the same in 







Table A.2.1 – NHIS/Medicare Data Linkage 
 
 
For those respondents who were diagnosed with CAD prior to their NHIS interview date, 
we have the ability to look at their smoking behavior before and after their diagnosis.  For the 
subset of CAD patients who underwent PCI or CABG, we can also look at their smoking 
behavior before and after their procedure.  For example, for individuals interviewed in 1994 who 
had PCI, we can look at their smoking behavior before and after their procedure only if they 
underwent PCI between 1991 and 1994 (and within 1994, only if their procedure was before the 
date of the NHIS interview).  If a person had PCI before 1991, then we have no record of their 
procedure.  If a person had PCI after 1994, then we have no record of their smoking behavior 
after their procedure.   
Each person in the linked dataset, therefore, has a “diagnosis window” within which they 
must be diagnosed with CAD to be included in our study. The longest window is for a person 
who was interviewed in 1998 – she will be included if she was enrolled in Medicare and 
diagnosed with CAD between 1991 and 1998 (prior to the interview date).  The shortest window 
is for a person who was interviewed in early 1999 – she will be included only if she was enrolled 
in Medicare and diagnosed with CAD on an earlier date in 1999 than the date of her interview.  
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
NHIS 1994-1998
NHIS 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Medicare 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
NHIS 1999-2005
NHIS 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Medicare 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Note: the Medicare years labeled on the chart are potentially useful for our study because they represent a Medicare record that is linked 







Table A.2.2 – Regression Results for Discrete Time Linear Probability Hazard Model, Testing 
for Significance of Pre-Treatment Differences in Quit Rate 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.045*** -0.048
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.032)
PCI * Period 7 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.013
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
PCI * Period 8 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
PCI * Period 9 0.037 0.035 0.030 0.029 0.031
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
PCI * ∆After 0.091** 0.055 0.036 0.035 0.023
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043)
CABG * Period 7 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.029
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
CABG * Period 8 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.016 0.011
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
CABG * Period 9 0.057* 0.054* 0.048 0.045 0.045
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
CABG * ∆After 0.226*** 0.197*** 0.161*** 0.156*** 0.137***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
∆Diagnosed 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.027)
∆AMI 0.081*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.075***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
CABG * Period 7 - PCI * Period 7 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.016
CABG * Period 8 - PCI * Period 8 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.025
CABG * Period 9 - PCI * Period 9 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014
CABG * ∆After - PCI * ∆After 0.135** 0.142** 0.125** 0.121** 0.114**
Elixhauser X X X
Demographics X X
Year, Period, Age, Yrs Smoked X
Observations 26,658 26,658 26,658 26,658 26,658
Individuals 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065
Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses.  Regressions are weighted by NHIS probability weights.  ∆AMI is an 
indicator for a patient having her first AMI (in our data) in a particular period.  Specifications 3 and 4 include 29 dummy variables indicating 
when the Elixhauser comorbidity conditions were first diagnosed (in our data).  In specification 4, demographic controls include gender, race, 
education dummies, and income category dummies (including a dummy for missing income data).  In specification 5, we also include year 
dummies, period dummies, age and age squared, and a variable indicating the number of years a person had been smoking as of the baseline 
period (9.5 years before treatment).   "CABG * ∆After - PCI * ∆After" is the difference between the PCI * ∆After and CABG * ∆After 
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